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COMMUNICATIONS LAW
By
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INTRODUCTION

While both Canadians and Americans are generous with rhetoric about
good neighbourliness and "the longest undefended border in the world," there
have been periods in which such words are said with tightened lips, as one
side or the other pursues unilateral policies that seem to bely belief in the
undefended border myth and indicate, instead, support for Robert Frost's
statement that "[glood fences make good neighbours." 1 The last few years
have witnessed several examples of unilateral action by Canada in various
sectors of the economy aimed at controlling foreign investment and resource
export, nationalization of key industries, and regulation of broadcasting in
ways that appear inimical to the traditional open relationship with the United
States. The purpose of this article is to study one facet of the Canadian-American relationship-specifically, Canadian action taken to regulate cable
television operation in Canada and the American reaction to the measures
adopted.

© Copyright, 1977, Katherine Swinton.
* The author is an Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
The author would like to express her appreciation to Professor Michael Reisman, Yale
Law School, who read and commented on earlier drafts of this paper.
1 Robert Frost, "Mending A Wall" in Selected Poems (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 1966) at 23.
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On December 21, 1972, the Canadian Radio-Television Commission2
granted an application to amend the broadcasting licence of a Calgary cable
television company carrying television signals from a station in Spokane,
Washington. In issuing its order, the CRTC included a novel condition in
the licence, requiring the applicant to delete or permit the deletion of commercial advertisements received from broadcasting stations not licensed to
broadcast in Canada (that is, American stations) on the request of local
broadcasting stations with whom it had entered into an agreement on this
subject approved by the CRTC. In the vacated spots, the licensee was to substitute advertisements from the local broadcaster or other appropriate replacement material.3 The imposition of this condition was a significant event,
which the United States Department of State had awaited with some apprehension since July, 1971, when the CRTC had issued a comprehensive policy
statement on cable television in Canada.4 The most controversial component
of that policy was the termination of the prohibition on altering received
broadcast signals. The CRTC would now permit cable televisionu operators
to remove commercial advertising from the signals of stations not licensed
to serve Canada and to substitute other material. In the reality of Canadian
broadcasting, the unlicensed station was a euphemism for American television
broadcasters.
Shortly after the order, on February 13, 1973, the State Department issued a protest to the Canadian government with regard to the Calgary licence.
A widespread implementation of this policy, or any other communications
policy bearing upon advertising carried by United States television stations,
carries grave implications. Canadians are the heaviest users of cable television
in the world, and most of the CATV operations rely on American television
stations for their signals. Certain border stations in the United States have
come to rely on the access provided to Canadian markets by CATV in order
to attract an advertising clientele wishing to reach Canadians. The commercial deletion policy and other governmental policies threatened this established situation.
The State Department's protest was the first of many interchanges on the
issue of advertising and cable television between Canada and the United
States over the next few years. In that period, a wide variety of participants,
including domestic courts, regulatory agencies, legislative bodies, and private
corporations, had an impact on the dispute and the evolution of cable television policy and law. Their roles and contributions provide an interesting
basis for studying the international decision-making process in operation.
The word "international" is used advisedly, despite a tendency towards
parochialism which often emerges in studies of Canadian-American relations.
Frequently, the relationship is described as unique and isolated from the inter2 Now the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, established by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 49, s. 3(1). Hereinafter referred to as CRTC.
SCalgary Cable TV Ltd., Community Antenna Television Ltd., 72 CRTC Decisions
364.
4 CRTC, Canadian Broadcasting: A Single System (July 16, 1971). The contents
of this policy will be discussed in the text, infra, following footnote 100.
5
Hereafter referred to as CATV.
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national system. Indeed, while sometimes contentious, the relationship is far
more cordial than that between most states. A recognition of interdependency,
coupled with a similarity of cultures and, in the past, a Canadian deference
to American policy, has led to cooperative efforts to address problems, either
institutionally or informally. 6 While the current broadcasting dispute is geographically a Canadian-American problem that will be worked out through
dialogue and cooperation, it cannot be regarded in isolation from the larger
system of international relations. The issue involved is communications-who,
if anyone, should control the flow of communications in the world and to
what extent. There is currently an avid global interest in communications,
and that consciousness, plus decisions taken in this larger system, affect the
positions adopted by various participants in the Canadian-American dispute.
Any decisions taken in the regional context similarly have an impact upon
international communications law. In an interdependent world, no regional
problem is insulated from the global arena.7
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMUNICATIONS
Communications is an especially sensitive concern in the world today.
Various elite groups seek to dominate the media because of their multiple
uses for economic, political, cultural, military, and educational purposes. Any
resource which is in limited supply and capable of many uses is valuable because of the law of supply and demand. Telecommunications media fall within such a category of valuable resources because of their scarcity. The
number of frequencies available for broadcast use is limited, and excessive
demand by any one state for control of the radio spectrum, or large parts
thereof, creates the risk of serious interference with the broadcast demands
of another state, either by preventing access to the spectrum by that state or
by causing technical interference with actual broadcasts of programmes. 8
Elites in societies today realize the advantages that derive from the control of telecommunications media. Before discussing the uses to which control
can be put, one should first consider the impact of telecommunications. The
impact of television, and to a much lesser degree of radio, is instantaneous
and not delayed, as in the print medium. While the reader must use his ima8 The International Joint Commission, established by the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909 R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-20, Sch., is often cited as a prime example of such cooperation. See, for example, M. Cohen, The Regime of Boundary Waters - The CanadianUnited States Experience (1975), 146 Receuil des Cours 219.
7 The problem, from one perspective, is communications, since advertisements,
which are the focus of the Canadian restrictions, can be regarded as both an integral
part of the broadcast and as a vital way to finance programming. Yet from another perspective, the problem is an economic one, with the Canadian measures no more than
a commonplace trading measure designed to restrict the flow of a certain class of goods
(in this case, advertisements) across the border. It is difficult to regard the economic
issue divorced from the communications issue, as further discussion will demonstrate.
8 D. Leive, International Telecommunications and International Law: The Regulation of the Radio Spectrum (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1970) at 1, 16; H. Leroy, Treaty Regulation of International Radio and Short Wave Broadcasting (1938), 32 Am. J. of Int.
L. 719. As both Leive and Leroy point out, the first efforts to regulate telecommunications at an international level focused on questions of frequency allocation and reduction
of interference with broadcast signals.
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gination to concretize the information conveyed by print, the television viewer
is presented with a picture of reality that he can internalize with little effort.
The picture presented may be one which he could actually experience or see
in his community, but more significantly, television can extend the viewer's
perception of reality from his actual surroundings to environments far beyond
his immediate vicinity. As Marshall McLuhan has pointed out, television can
create a global village. 9
A further reason for wishing to control telecommunications lies in the
extent of its geographical coverage. With the present state of technology, telecommunications knows no political boundaries in the way that print or telephone does. While a state can prohibit importation of magazines or extension
of telephone cables, it is faced with difficulties when radio or television are
to be kept out.' 0 The state of the art is not yet sufficiently developed to eliminate unintentional spillover of signals from one nation to another. To prevent
spillover, intentional or unintentional, a state can only resort to costly and
inconvenient jamming methods, which are not totally effective."
Television, in its conventional form in which signals are transmitted
from the broadcasting station directly to home receivers, is a resource with
great influence on world order. Coupled with new technologies such as cable
television and direct broadcasting by satellites, its range of coverage is extended and its potential uses vastly expanded. For some, the development can
only be viewed with foreboding or alarm. Although the technology is not yet
sufficiently advanced to permit direct broadcasting from satellites to receivers
in a way which is economical, this development will come in the not too distant future.' 2 Already satellites can be used for direct broadcasting to community receivers.' 3 Thus, there is an increased international awareness of the
importance of telecommunications and a concern for their regulation.
It is a recognition of this potential impact of the telecommunications
media and of the uses to which these media can be put that has led various
groups to seek control over the media. Clearly, telecommunications are an
important tool for acculturation: for introducing and emphasizing the norms
of the society and its heritage. In tribal societies, a story-teller-whether a
nurse, mother, or village leader-would relate folktales that told of societal
norms in a compelling way and within a concrete situation that illustrated the
application of norms and dramatized history.' 4 Television and radio, while
9 M. McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extension of Man (Toronto: Signet
Books, 1964), particular chapter 31.
1o D. Abshire, InternationalBroadcasting:A New Dimension of Western Diplomacy,
The Washington Papers No. 35 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications) at 44-45.
1Id. at 47-48.
12 Ile year 1985 has been mentioned as a possibility. See Canada/Sweden Working
Paper to the Direct Broadcasting Satellite Working Group, A/AC 105/WG. 3/L 1
(April 24, 1970) at 2.
's India and the United States signed the first international agreement to develop
a direct satellite broadcasting programme for educational purposes. Signals from the
satellite will be received by community receivers without intervention of ground relay
stations (A/AC 105/72).
14 See M. Reisman, "Foreword" to F. Deng, Dinka Folktales (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1974).
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used for many purposes, can play to a great extent the same role as the storyteller, relating information about the society and emphasizing what are perceived by at least some elites to be the acceptable norms for that society. The
analogy to folktales must not be too closely drawn, for local villagers often
had an input into the tales and adapted them, keeping them harmonious with
society, whereas television is a passive medium demanding no input from the
viewer and often portraying a society that is perceived or desired by the controlling members of society without ever capturing changes in the real world.
Furthermore, acculturation in the twentieth century, while greatly dependent
on media, also relies on institutions such as schools to inculcate norms and
culture.
Nevertheless, telecommunications, because of its predominance, is inevitably an important tool for acculturation. Related to this is its importance
as a political tool, whether for forging national unity, or fostering internationalism, or for military purposes. On a national level, telecommunications
serve an important role in introducing political leaders, and in promoting
awareness of domestic political issues and a common political future. This is
closely allied to acculturation, for the norms which one inculcates may include political norms such as respect for individual rights.' 5 This is true for
developed countries and even more so for developing countries that are newly
independent and trying to create a national identity in the face of centrifugal
forces such as tribal loyalties or geographical barriers. A national television
system can then be a strategic government resource.'8
On an international level, telecommunications can also be a potential
political force, this time for promoting international political awareness. The
media can be used to facilitate international exchanges of cultural, educational, and technical information in the hope that increased international cooperation and understanding will result.17 Just as easily, telecommunications
on an international level can be used in a manner inimical to peace and security. Rather than use telecommunications to promote internationalism, a poliin an effort to
tical elite in one state may use media for propaganda purposes
8
weaken another regime and to acquire political dominance.'
15 The importance of telecommunications in this sense is recognized by a recent

Canadian government publication, which stated,
The social identity of a country resides in a community of thoughts and ideas, of
values, of social and political institutions, a community which can be maintained

and developed only through the free flow of expression and the easy dissemination
and exchange of information.

Canada, Department of Communications, Proposals for a Communications Policy of
Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973) at 8.
16 P. Laskin and A. Chayes, "Report of the Panel on International Telecommunications Policy" in Am. Soc. of Int. L., Direct Broadcasting from Satellites: Policies and

Problems (Washington: West Publishing Co., 1975) at 6.
17 See, for example, Canada/Sweden, Working Paper, supra, note 12 at 12, setting
out the objectives of an international policy on direct broadcasting from satellites.
18 Propaganda uses for radio were discovered early, as Leroy shows in his discussion of Germany and other European states in the 1930's (supra, note 8 at 728-30).
Radio Free Europe, Voice of America and BBC External Service are continuing examples of uses of the media to broadcast information suppressed by the state of the
hearers. See also Abshire, supra, note 10 at 19-20 (re: German propaganda) and at
22-35 for a discussion of international broadcasting services.
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There are groups, other than political elites, that realize the important
uses of telecommunications. Telecommunications can also be an important
source of economic power. Broadcasting, when carried on as a commercial
undertaking, is lucrative for those who own the broadcasting operations,
whether networks or individual stations, because of the profits from advertising. It is also profitable for those who advertise on broadcasting outlets.
On an immediate level, advertising allows a commercial enterprise to expand
its markets, by attracting new customers for its products or by introducing
new products to an existing mass market.1 9 It also allows the advertiser to
economize by creating greater uniformity in demand for products, allowing
standardization of products.
In addition, the dependence of the broadcasting industry on advertising,
in certain countries such as the United States, allows a business enterprise to
structure the output of the communications industry. The adage, "he who
pays20 the piper calls the tune," can be aptly applied to the broadcasting industry. The leverage of his economic power allows the advertiser to control the
content of what is televised. He can demand that programmes appeal to the
widest possible audience even though this may involve stifling controversial
material or portraying material in the manner most favourable to his product
and his economic system. Thus, the economic elite can have a significant input
into the acculturation as well as the consumption pattern of the individual.
Finally, the value of telecommunications for many other uses is easily
deduced-to broadcast comprehensive programmes to combat illiteracy and
to inform about health care, agriculture, family planning, community programmes, and other priorities of governments or interest groups. It is understandable, therefore, that many claimants wish to share in the development of
a policy dealing with the broadcast media. It is clearly in the interest of a
nation state to seek to control the media, either to protect its citizens from
subversive outside information and cultural intrusion or to foster cultural
identity and integration. Some states may wish to see an absence of government controls in order to promote internationalism or benefit their broadcasters financially. 21 There are also claims from military groups who wish to
control the media for propaganda purposes, from corporations who realize
the value of the media to expand and structure markets, from skill groups
who wish to protect moral values from derogation. Some of these claimants
demand national control of the media; others oppose it. Even within one
state claimants may vary in the degree to which they advocate state control
of the media.
C. POLICIES
While many groups wish to have an input into telecommunications policy,
19 M. Jones, The Cultural and Social Impact of Advertising on American Society
(1970), 8 Osgoode Hall L. J. 65 at 67.
20
M. Johnson, Freedom to Create: The Implications of Anti-Trust Policy for Television ProgrammingContent (1970), 8 Osgoode Hall L.J. 11; H. Schiller, Mass Communicationsand American Empire (New York: Augustus Kelley, 1969); S. Cohen, The
Advertiser's Influence in TV Programming (1970), 8 Osgoode Hall L.J. 91 at 109.
2
1 This is the fear expressed with regard to the U.S. See Schiller, id.; Laskin and
Chayes, supra, note 16.
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there is little agreement on the scope of the policy that should be formulated.
Although the focus in this paper is on a dispute over advertising on Canadian
cable television, the positions taken by Canada and the United States are in
part shaped by larger considerations about telecommunications policy. International interest in telecommunications, evidenced as early as the 1860's,22
has increased in intensity during the last decade with the development of
direct satellite broadcasting. The issue of control over the content of telecommunications, while a subject of discussion with regard to radio,2 3 is perceived as much more urgent now. Policy positions that have emerged from
discussions tend to reflect one of two biases: either "free flow of information"
or "territorial sovereignty.12 4 In choosing a policy for regulation of telecommunications, one's goal should be to devise a policy that promotes the dignity
of the individual. The following pages will discuss the alternative policies presently advocated in an effort to define a policy that favours individual freedom and dignity.
The free flow of information position is founded on a belief that an
individual has a right to freedom of information in order to promote his or
her personal liberty. As in domestic constitutions which recognize a right to
freedom of information, there is an underlying assumption that individual
freedom of speech is a fundamental value to be safeguarded in society. Freedom is fostered by the unfettered exchange of ideas, for, in Mr. Justice Holme's
oft-repeated words:
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by the free trade in ideas - that
the best truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely

can be carried out.2

In functional terms, the proponents of this position argue that an absence of
controls is required in order to foster the interchange of ideas necessary for
increased mutual understanding. It is assumed that this understanding will,
in turn, contribute to international peace and security. Finally, it is said that
free flow of information is necessary to international social and economic
development, allowing less developed countries to have access to technical
and scientific information.
One can draw support for the free flow of information position from
many sources, including Article I of the United Nations Charter, with its reference to the institution's goal of achieving international cooperation.2 6
22
1n 1865 the International Telegraphic Union, the first international regulatory
body for communications, was established. See Leroy and Leive, supra, note 8.
23
Leroy refers to the concern over the use of propaganda by radio in the 1930's,
particularly by Germany, supra, note 8 at 728, 736.
24
Discussion has occurred largely in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space and its Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites.
2
5Abrams v. United States (1919), 250 U.S. 616 per Holmes J. dissenting, at 630.
2
6 Article 1 states that the purposes of the United Nations include:
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion....
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More explicitly, the U.N. Declarationon Human Rights expressly recognizes
a right to freedom of information. 27 The InternationalCovenant on Civil and
PoliticalRights expresses this right as follows:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
or in print, in the form of art, or through
of frontiers, either orally, in writing
any other media of his choice.2 8

While freedom of speech is a right that many states advocate at least
verbally, if not by conduct, there is little support for total, unregulated exercise of this right. In international telecommunications law, even states that
favour a right of freedom of expression2 9 feel that it must be restricted at
times because of competing policies and rights. Television or radio broadcasts
from the territory of one state into that of another may be viewed as an invasion of "national privacy."30 Such broadcasting is perceived as a violation of
a state's territorial sovereignty, as recognized in Article 2(1) of the U.N.
Charter. Broadcasting need not be directly aimed at foreign territory in order
to be regarded as offensive. Unintentional spillover of television signals cannot be prevented within the current state of technology and, in irregularly
shaped territories, may never reach such a stage of precision.s'
There are many reasons that lead states to claim the right to control the
content of television broadcasting, as an earlier discussion of the uses of television leads one to realize. To some extent, one can postulate that the motivation for regulation expressed by the various elites in a state will have a
direct bearing on the type and degree of regulation resulting. For some political elites, survival may depend on total control of the media, both of plant
27

See Preamble and Article 19:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information through any media and regardless of frontiers.
28
Article 19(2), Resolution 2200 (XXI), December 16, 1966. While Article 19
seems to recognize an extensive right to freedom of information, it must read in toto.
Subsection 3 provides for curtailment of the freedom in the following words:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with
it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or

of public health or morals.
If this is a self-judging provision, it would tend to undercut much of the efficiency of
subsection 2.
The U.N.'s concern with freedom of information dates back to 1946, when the General
Assembly declared freedom of information to be a fundamental human right and authorized the holding of an international conference on the issue (Resolutions 31(1) and
59(I), December 14, 1946). Subsequent efforts to obtain the adoption of a "Draft Convention on Freedom of Information" proved abortive. A brief history of the U.N. action
in this area can be found in a document of the Secretariat, "Draft Convention on Freedom of Information," Note by the Secretariat, A/AC 105/WG 3/L. 2 (April 10, 1973).
29For example, Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
80 The expression is used by C. Dalfen in The International Legislative Process:
Direct Broadcasting and Remote Earth Sensing by Satellite Compared (1972), 10 Can.

Y.B. of Int. L. 186 at 192.
31 Laskin and Chayes, supra, note 16 at 4.
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and content, in order to prevent criticism and expression of competing policies. International broadcasting is seen as a threat to national security by such
elites. For other political elites, particularly in developing countries, control
of the national media may seem necessary for the presentation of a comprehensive development plan. Commercial programming from another culture
may distort economic priorities by inducing demand for consumer products
that the domestic market is unable or unwilling to provide at that time. Such

programming may threaten cultural identity, jeopardize educational programmes, and engender frustration when different lifestyles are shown.
Foreign programming will reflect the priorities, values, and assumptions
of foreign states. Even "impartial" news reporting may reflect the biases of
foreign governments,3 while programmes will reflect the mores and norms
of that society. Not only may these mores be inconsistent with government

priorities of the recipient state-for example, by advocating
consumerism in
33

a socialist economy-but they may also be offensive.
What begins to emerge from discussions about the free flow of broadcasting is a realization that most states-open or closed, developing or developed-fear that the flow of broadcasting will be in only one direction, that is,
from the United States to other nations. Monroe Price describes this phe-

nomenon as "information imperialism." 34 Since the United States is the most

technologically advanced state in television broadcasting and already by far
the largest exporter of television programming, 35 the United States appears
to be the prime beneficiary of free flow in information. As Schiller says,
Information moving between nations on the basis of "economic opportunities" and

"competition" unimpeded by other national or cultural considerations, affords
American communications media the same advantages American commerce now
receives from "free" world trade patterns that are also minimally controlled by
3
national states. A

82 This results from the reporter's dependence on government sources for much of
his information, as well as his reliance on colleagues who tap the same sources. This
can have consequences, including co-optation to the government's viewpoint and reluctance to use certain information for fear of being denied access to channels of information. See T. Crouse, The Boys on the Bus (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972) at 7-8,
233-35; Johnson, supra, note 20 at 41-42.
83 C. Dalfen in Direct Satellite Broadcasting: Towards International Arrangements
to Transcend and Marshall the Political Realities (1970), 20 U. of T. LJ.366, refers

to the example of an advertisement for Maidenform bras in Moslem countries. Less
dramatic, but perhaps just as disruptive or offensive, may be programmes dealing with
subjects such as abortion, homosexuality or even divorce in states where such practices
are prohibited. In the Canadian-American context, one can point to Canadian preoccupation with the Vietnam war or racial issues prevalent in the U.S. as examples of the
effect of relying on foreign news sources.
84 M. Price, First Amendment Constraints and the Direct Satellite Controversy in
Am. Soc. of It. L., Direct Broadcasting from Satellites: Policies and Problems, supra,
note 16 at 38-39.
S5 J.Powell in Direct Broadcast Satellites, The Conceptual Convergence of the Free
Flow of Information and National Sovereignty (1975), 6 Calif. W. Int. L. J.1 at 18 n.
49 says that four nations lead the world in the export of television programmes. In the
early 1970's, the U.S. led with 150,000 hours while the U.K. and France, tied in second
place, had only 20,000 hours. See, also, Schiller, supra, note 20 at 82; Friendly et al.,
The Control of Program Content in International Telecommunications: A Discussion of
General Principles (1974), 13 Colum. J. of Transnat. L. 40.
80 Schiller, supra, note 20 at 6. See also, Laskin & Chayes, supra, note 16 at 8-9.
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Current American programming is frequently criticized for its banality, violence, and insipidity-all characteristics that are usually attributed to the
commercial model on which the United States broadcasting industry is structured. 37 The advertiser's concern with high ratings demands programmes with
wide appeal. Other states may wish to aim programming at more than the
lowest common denominator out of a desire to reach various minority audiences, or they may prefer a portrayal of different values. Furthermore, they
may wish to avoid the commercial model of broadcasting altogether, for fear
that the market for local products will be endangered by multinational corporations advertising internationally, or that development plans will be jeopardized, or because it is national policy not to have commercial broadcasting.A8
What is emerging in discussions of broadcasting in the international
sphere is a recognition of the need for some state role in regulating signals
that cross its borders. In various international bodies discussing telecommunications, particularly the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites80 of
the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNESCO, and the
International Telecommunications Union, there is support for a system of
"prior consent" from states. 40 According to this principle, a state must consent in advance to programmes broadcast into its territory from another state.
Coupled with the right of consent may be an emerging right of participation
-as recommended by Canada and Sweden in their "Draft Principles Governing Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellite" contained in their submission
to the DBS Working Group-which would allow a state consenting to foreign
41
broadcasts to participate in activities involving coverage of its territory.
The precise limits of the prior consent principle are still the subject of
debate. The United States continues to advocate the free flow of information,
opposing state control of broadcast content. 42 Other states, such as Canada
87

Johnson, supra, note 20 at 18-26, discusses various goals to seek in a television

programming policy: creativity, diversity, flexibility, competition, individual participation, and prevention of excessive power. He concludes that the commercial structure of
the U.S. industry leads instead to self-censorship, excessive orthodoxy, cultural lag, and
lack of creativity.
Jones, supra, note 19 at 71, discusses the values emerging from advertising:
materialism, reliance on externally derived solutions, and the assumption that individuals
are externally motivated.
88
As in France or the United Kingdom. See Laskin and Chayes, supra,note 16 at 9.
89
Hereinafter referred to as DBS.
40
In the UNESCO Declarationof Guiding Principleson the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Education and Greater Cultural
Exchange, Article IX states:
1. In order to further the objectives set out in the preceding articles, it is necessary that States, taking into account the principle of freedom of information,
reach or promote prior agreements concerning direct satellite broadcasting to the
population of countries other than the country of origin of the transmission.
UNESCO, Doe. 17 C/76, adopted November 15, 1972.
41
Article V, found in the Working Paper submitted to the Fourth Session of the
Working Group, A/AC 105/WG 3/L. 4 at 15. The proposal is further discussed in the
Working Paper to the Fifth Session, A/AC 105/WG 3/L. 8 (February 13, 1974) at 8.
42 The United States was alone in voting against Resolution 2916 (XXVII) of the
General Assembly which requested the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
to undertake the elaboration of principles governing the use of DBS.

1977]

Cable Television

and Sweden, favour a system of prior consent and participation, while states
such as the U.S.S.R. favour strict controls over international broadcasting. With
such a situation of flux in international telecommunications law, the Canadian-American dispute over CATV has implications far beyond the North
American continent. Canada's policy is one that asserts a state's right to control the content of television signals beamed across its borders. The United
States, partly because of its predominant power position in the world, must
be alert to the impact that any decision recognizing a Canadian right to control would have on the larger question of state control of television broadcasting in international law.
If one were to evaluate the conflicting policy proposals in terms of their
conformity to goals of human dignity, it would seem that a policy with
controls on information should be sought. An individual is subject to multiple
loyalties-to family, to province or regional unit, to nation, and perhaps to
the world community. The fact that an individual does feel identity with and
loyalty to a nation state does not prevent him from developing a loyalty to
the international community. Loyalty is not a zero-sum game, although admittedly loyalties introduce the possibility of conflicts. It is beneficial to an
individual to identify with groups for purposes of self-definition, as means to
achieve desired ends, or as a value in and of itself.43 There is no reason to
believe that the destruction or undermining of a national identity in order to
produce some bland "international citizen" is feasible or even desirable. The
disorientation and anomie which would likely result would probably be more
destructive of world peace than a fostering of the present mix of identities.44
The ideal international telecommunications policy will take account of
the benefit of national loyalties and the contribution of telecommunications
to their development, as discussed above. Simultaneously, account must be
taken of the use of telecommunications to foster international understanding.
The goal must be to provide access to the telecommunications media by national groups, a fact that requires some degree of nation-state control of the
broadcast's content. This control should not, however, extend to wholesale
control of content, for the free flow of ideas from outside the borders is
necessary to introduce competing ideas and to allow the individual some
freedom of choice in forming his opinions. Some broadcast time should be
open to outside programming, perhaps with the caveat that the content not be
"morally offensive." This phrase is dangerous and open to misinterpretation,
4

3 H. Guetzkow, in Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization (Princeton: Center for Research on World Political Institutions,
No. 4, 1955) at 16-26, 37, 54, discusses the various bases of individual loyalty. They
include:
(a) loyalty as a means to an end, such as the obtaining of personal goals or the
enhancement of self-image, and
(b) loyalty as an end in itself, for self-avoidance or in order to lose oneself in

the totality, and
(c) loyalty as part of a "pattern" of loyalties, with loyalty to a sub-unit fostering
loyalty to units broader than that region.
44 Group loyalty is a fact of international life. To expect wholesale "internationalism"
seems to ignore the widespread tendency to identify with smaller "national" groups viz. the independence movements in Scotland, Wales, and Quebec, as well as the U.N.
endorsement of self-determination of peoples.
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for in some countries moral offensiveness will refer to matters regarded as
obscene or vicious; in others, political opinions contrary to the regime will be
so denoted. It is the first example, not the second, to which reference is made.
The prior consent policy discussed earlier does not really satisfy this
aim, for it allows a state to prevent all outside broadcasts and thus could
completely hamper the international exchange of ideas. It is the degree of
foreign access that should be the subject of discussion, not the content of each
telecast. That degree of control should never be allowed to close borders to
the flow of ideas.
D. THE INTERNATIONAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Before discussing the Canadian-American cable television dispute within the context of this policy proposal, it may be beneficial to show why the
dispute is important to the broader international arena.
International legal norms do not emerge from a sovereign legislative
body, for none exists in the international sphere. Law consists of decisions
made by institutions, individuals, and groups regarded as having the authority
to make such decisions in compliance with authoritative procedures and as
having sufficient control to enforce them. While a prescription may be enunciated by an institution claiming that a practice is 'law,' the norm can only be
so regarded if those affected comply with it because they regard it as authoritative. Thus, international law should be regarded as a process rather than
as a fixed body of prescriptions, for conduct is as important as enunciated
norms in determining the 'law' on a given subject.45
Furthermore, one cannot focus only on an isolated group of actors such
as courts and legislatures in studying a legal problem. Participants in the decision-making process include states, international organizations, corporations,
interest groups, institutions within states such as courts or government agencies, and individuals. 46 Clearly, the impact of each entity on the decision
process will not be equal, for the participants are not equal in the resources
which they possess: power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection,
respect, and rectitude. Obviously a state has much greater power than an informal citizens' association concerned with a single issue such as national
identity. Consequently, it has a larger voice in decision-making. In addition,
one must look at other factors affecting the participants' involvement in the
decision-making process: the situations in which a given interaction occurs
and the strategies adopted.
45 The following discussion reflects a policy science approach to international law.
More comprehensive discussion can be found in M. McDougall, H. Lasswell, and M.

Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence
(1968), 8 Va. J. of Int. L. 188; J. Moore, Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudenceof Myres
McDougall & Harold Lasswell (1968), 54 Va. L. Rev. 662; F.S. Tipson, The LassvellMcDougall Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity (1974), 14 Va.

J. of Int. L. 535.
46

In the context of the Canadian-American dispute, these actors include individuals
and institutions within the Canadian and American governments (the executives, legislative branches, regulatory agencies, government departments) and interest groups such
as nationalist lobbies, broadcasters, actors' unions, and corporate advertisers.
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To assess the law, one must approach a problem contextually, looking
at the various functions of decision-making: intelligence-gathering, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal. Together, these functions, as influenced by the various participants, allow one
to decide what is the law. While the traditional legal approach is to focus on
the prescription and application processes, the other functions are equally
important to the analysis of a legal problem, for a prescribed norm may never
be applied to certain groups, or it may be effectively ignored and so terminated.
Thus, in a problem involving international telecommunications law, one
cannot focus on the regulation of cable television advertising by Canadian
officials as a narrow issue concerning only rules defined by the Canadian and
United States governments. The issue must be regarded in a wider context,
not only regionally, but also internationally. Any decision taken by a participant in the international decision-making process will affect the development
of the larger subject of international telecommunications law and its direction
toward policies of free flow of information or controlled access. In turn,
positions adopted by these participants will be determined, at least in part,
by decisions already made or being made by participants in larger arenas
dealing with international telecommunications law, including the United
Nations and other international organizations.
Within this framework, one can now turn to the present cable television
controversy, looking at the various claimants involved in the decision-making
process and the policy directions they advocate, and then proceed to discuss
the decisions that they have made which affect the law in this area.
E. CLAIMANTS
I. The Canadian Government
Canada is a nation which, like the United States, recognizes the value
of a right of freedom of speech. Section 1 (d) of the Bill of Rights47 recognizes and declares a right to freedom of speech. Although this document is of
limited effect, 48 there is a longstanding tradition of free debate in the country.
Yet even though freedom of speech is widely advocated, this right coexists
with a tradition of government control over broadcasting, a control that is not
restricted to technical regulation but which extends to content as well. From
the earliest days of broadcasting in Canada4 9 there has been a preoccupation
with the need to develop a distinctively Canadian broadcasting system, if
necessary by government subsidy or regulation. 50 This is not surprising if one
considers Canada's geographic proximity to the United States and its population of 23.5 million strung out along a 4,000 mile border beside more than
4

7

R.S.C. 1970, App. Ill.

48 This is due partly to its restricted application to the federal sphere and partly to

the courts' great reluctance to give the Bill effect. See W. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian
Bill of Rights (2d ed. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, Carleton Library Series, 1975).
49
See, for example, Canada, Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting, Report
(Aird Commission) (1929).
50 P. Johanssen, The Canadian Radio-Television Commission and the Canadianization of Broadcasting (1973), 26 Fed. Comm. B.I. 183 at 185-86.
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200 million Americans. This reality colours all of Canada's political activity,
whether in foreign, economic, or cultural policy, and many actions taken by

the Canadian government are aimed at establishing counterbalances to U.S.
predominance. 1
In broadcasting, the Canadian government has always been concerned
with using communications to establish an east-west link in a country that in
rational geographic terms would tend to run north-south. As earlier discussion, in more general terms, pointed out, programming from the United States
tends to impart certain values or images. Such programming, especially accessible because of the identity of language between Canada and her neighbour,
the technical facility for picking up signals off the air or by cable television,
pull
and the similar attitudes and life style, risks reinforcing the north-south
2
and undermining efforts to strengthen the Canadian cultural identity.
It has always been the policy of the Canadian government to foster
Canadian unity through the broadcasting system. The most concise avowal
of this policy is found in the BroadcastingAct,53 enacted in 1968 with only
one dissenting vote. Its long title expressly describes the statute as "An Act
to implement a broadcasting policy for Canada." More significantly, section
3 of the Act contains a unique statement of policy objectives. For purposes
of the present discussion, several of these policies are enlightening and warrant
quotation:
It is hereby declared that
(a) broadcasting undertakings in Canada make use of radio frequencies that are
public property and such undertakings constitute a single system, herein referred to as the Canadian broadcasting system, comprising public and private
elements;
(b) the Canadian broadcasting system should be effectively owned and controlled
by Canadians so as to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political,
social and economic fabric of Canada;
(d) the programming provided by the Canadian broadcasting system should be
varied and comprehensive and should provide reasonable, balanced views on
matters of public concern, and the programming provided should be of high
standard, using predominantly Canadian creative and other resources....

The Canadian ownership component is not unusual, for several states adopt
a similar requirement for strategic reasons, not wishing to leave such an important tool for national expression in foreign hands.54 It is the programming

provision in subsection (d) which is most significant, for it has been the
underpinning of many "Canadian content" regulations and licensing conditions.
51

This is the rationale underlying the "third option" approach in the Trudeau government's foreign policy: increased European and Japanese contact are sought to balance
U.S. influence. See, also, A. Gotlieb and C. Dalfen, National Jurisdiction and International Responsibility:New CanadianApproaches to InternationalLaw (1973), 67 Am.

J. of Int. L. 229 at 230, 258.
52
See F. Peers, "Oh, say can you see?" in I. Lumsden, ed. Close the 49th parallel,
etc.: The Americanization of Canada (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1970) 135 at 153-54;
Canada, Proposalsfor a Communications Policy, supra, note 15 at 8.
53

R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11 as amended.
For example, the United States CommunicationsAct contains such a requirement
(47 U.S.C. § 301(2) (1); § 310 (a) (1) - no broadcast licence shall be issued to
an alien).
54
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Despite the express concern for Canadian content, the government in the
early 1970's was not satisfied with the way in which its policy had been
implemented. American programming continued to dominate Canadian television and a Canadian programming industry was not developing as anticipated. In its 1973 Green Paper on Communications Policy, the federal
Department of Communications noted the failure of Canadian programming
to keep up with technological developments. After referring to the American
omnipresence, the paper stated:
It is therefore essential that a high priority be given to the accelerated development of Canadian creative resources and to greatly increased production and distribution facilities . . . The problem for Canadians is not primarily one of
excluding foreign programming and sources of information but rather of ensuring
access and exposure to such Canadian material as may be available, and of ensuring that available Canadian material is comprehensive and of excellent quality. 55

The concern of the Canadian government, then, is one of access for Canadian
broadcasters: access to programme time and access to resources that allow
broadcasters to produce programmes. That concern has shaped the policies
and programmes developed by Parliament and its agents.
The concern, while focused on communications theory, is heavily coloured by economic consideration. Canada's broadcasting system is based on
a commercial model, similar to that in the U.S."8 In such a broadcasting system, advertising is essential to the production of television programmes. Without revenue from advertising, local stations cannot pay programme producers
or networks the necessary royalties for the use of programme products, thus
restricting production of programmes. In Canada, it is perceived that advertising revenue which should be available to generate programming in that
country is finding its way instead to the United States television stations near
the border. Television signals of these stations, sometimes obtainable off the
air by individual antennae, are normally carried into Canada by an extensive
web of cable television undertakings.57 The effect on television advertising
from this extended coverage by CATV is twofold. First, many Canadian companies have, in the past, chosen to advertise on American stations rather than
on Canadian outlets. This is especially true in the two largest Enelish-sneaking areas in Canada: Toronto and Vancouver. In Vancouver, KVOS-TV of
Bellingham, Washington, a city of 50,000, reaches about 1,600,000 Canadians
and obtains more than 90 percent of its annual $7 million revenue from Vancouver. In the Toronto area, 4,000,000 Canadians receive the signals of three
Buffalo stations, WGR-TV, WIVB-TV (formerly WBEN-TV), and WKBW55

Supra, note 15 at 8. See, also, A. Gotlieb, The TransnationalFlow of Informa-

tion: A CanadianPerspective (1974), 68 Am. Soc. of Int. L. Proceedings 127 at 133.
U6 Although the ownership of Canada's broadcasting system is a mix of public and
private elements, the publicly-owned Canadian Broadcasting Corporation accepts commercials in its television operations.
57
Canada is the most heavily cabled country in the world with 41.9 percent of its
households linked to a cable television system in 1975. (Canadian Radio-Television
Commission, Annual Report, 1975-76, Table 16, at 34). This is an increase from 29.8
percent in 1972. The number of subscribers in the U.S. has also risen dramatically in
this period, from 4.5 million in 1970 to 9.8 million in 1975 (New York Times, December 15, 1976, at D15, col. 1) but is in no way as extensive as in Canada.
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TV, which serves 1,500,000 Americans. The estimated revenue from Toronto
advertisers is $10 million per year.58
Aside from this direct drain on Canadian advertising revenues, there is
an indirect one which is more difficult to calculate. This drain comes from
the spillover effect of advertisements placed by multinational corporations on
television stations in the United States which are carried into Canada. Because of the extensive product duplication in Canadian and American markets, there is no need for multinationals to purchase advertising time in Canada
as well as in the U.S. It would seem that the multinationals gain a windfall
from this spillover, rather than the American stations, since the advertising
rates on the U.S. stations are calculated on the basis of U.S. population alone.50
The benefit seems extensive, and has been estimated to be as high as $30-40
million annually. 6o
The Canadian government has felt that advertising revenue needed for
the development of Canadian programming in a commercial broadcasting
system has been lured away by the U.S. stations. The desire to divert this
revenue back to Canada has been the underlying motivation for the commercial deletion and programme substitution policies and for the recent amendments to the Income Tax Act. 61
The Canadian broadcasting industry is subject to a variety of regulatory
bodies. In implementing its Canadianization policy, the Canadian government
has worked largely through the Canadian Radio-Television Commission, 2 an
independent regulatory agency of fifteen members. The CRTC is designated
under the BroadcastingAct with the regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system in order to carry out the broadcasting policy enunciated in section 3 of the Act. 3 The Commission has the authority to make
regulations applicable to all broadcast licensees" and to issue broadcasting
licences with such conditions as are necessary to implement the policy.0 5 To
date, the Commission has adopted an independent and nationalistic approach
58

Miller, "Peace Talks arranged in 'border TV war"' Toronto Star, October 5, 1976,
at 5, col. 1. It is estimated that 40-50 percent of Toronto viewers watch Buffalo stations
(Toronto Star, October 20, 1976, at 1).
59 U.S. H. of Rep., Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, 93rd Cong. 2nd sess., April 15, 1974, at 26.
60 Can. Sen. Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, 30th Parl.
Ist sess., Issue 87, May 19, 1976, at 87:26. This estimate is by Harry Boyle, then Chairman of the CRTC. It is difficult to measure the precise economic effect of the advertising dollar drain. Boyle's estimate may be high, for the Hon. Jeanne Sauv6, Minister of
Communications, estimated the total advertising drain, from both multinational corporation ads and Canadian ads in the U.S. as $15-20 million annually (Issue 84, May 6,

1975, at 84:37).'

61S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 106 amending S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63. See text infra, note 168.
2Now the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (S.C.
1974-75-76, c. 49). In addition to this agency, certain aspects of broadcasting are regulated by the Department of Communications and the Cabinet. See A. Gotlieb, The Individual and the Telecommunications Regulatory Process in Canada (1973), 25 Admin.
Law Rev. 175.
6 3 Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11, s. 15.

64Id., s. 16.
65 Id., s. 17.
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to broadcasting regulation under its previous chairmen, Pierre Juneau, and
his successor, Harry Boyle. 66
Another government body with impact on broadcasting policy is the
Department of External Affairs. While the CRTC and, to some degree, the
Cabinet are focusing on the immediate communications dispute, External
Affairs must look at this issue within the larger context of its global impact
and effect on ongoing Canadian-American relations. Thus, there is room for
conflict between various spokesmen for the Canadian government as to the
best policy to be sought.
2.

The United States Government
The United States government position with regard to control over
broadcasting has traditionally been in favour of freedom of expression and
absence of government controls over broadcasting, other than technical
regulations to prevent interference.6 7 Clearly, constitutional constraints are a
major factor in the adoption of this policy position, for the First Amendment
reads, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press ...

."

Controls on programme content, such as the prior con-

sent criterion discussed in the DBS Working Group,68 or restrictions that
limit the amount of foreign programming content, are regarded as unconstitutional. 69 Just as it is difficult for Americans to understand the suspicion with
which their presence is often viewed in foreign countries, it is difficult for
non-Americans to realize the depth of attachment to the symbolic value of
the free speech guarantee in the U.S. Constitution. Nationals of states more
accustomed to government regulation or unused to an active system of judicial
review to protect fundamental freedoms may not understand how distasteful
government regulation of broadcasting content is in the United States.70
66

Mr. Boyle was recently succeeded by Dr. Pierre Camu. The CRTC's independence has been criticized, with one commentator expressing apprehension at its tendency
to set itself up as "the Parliament of Broadcasting." D. Baum, Broadcasting Regulation
in Canada: The Power of Decision (1975), 13 Osgoode Hall L.i. 693 at 694.

Boyle, in an article written while he was still Vice Chairman of the CRTC, evinced a

deep concern for commercial domination of programming. This article provides insight
into the CRTCs perspective on broadcasting regulation (Responsibility in Broadcasting
(1970), 8 Osgoode Hall L.i. 119, passim.).
67 This is not to say that there is a dearth of regulations in the communications
sphere. The CommunicationsAct of 1934, as amended (47 U.S.C. § 301. ff.), regulates
television through a licensing system administered by the Federal Communications Commission (47 U.S.C. § 151). Hereinafter referred to as FCC.
68
Supra, note 41.
69
Such prior restraints on speech are viewed with hostility by the U.S. Supreme
Court. See New York Times Co. v. United States (1971), 403 U.S. 713; Columbia
Broadcasting System Inc. v. Democratic National Committee (1973), 412 U.S. 94.
Interestingly, the court has upheld the FCC's fairness doctrine, requiring equal time for
responses to personal attacks in controversial public issues and to political editorializing
- both questions of "access" somewhat analogous to Canadian broadcasting policy concerns. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission (1969),

395 U.S.
367.
70

Richard O'Hagan, then Minister-Counsellor (Information) at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, noted this concern for the First Amendment in testimony before
the Canadian Senate External Affairs Committee (30th ParI. 1st sess., Issue 14, May 15,
1975, at 14:18).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

(VOL. 15, NO. 3

While the United States government position on communications policy
rests partly on constitutional bases, it is submitted that there are further reasons for the favour shown to the free flow of information. As noted earlier,
free flow of information at present means that American commercial networks
dominate programming in the international market. The profits generated
enrich the U.S. as a whole, and the cultural homogenization that follows can
only inure to the U.S. government's benefit.
That commercial motives colour the U.S. position is difficult to doubt.
The U.S. has nothing to fear from freedom of information, for the commercial structure of its industry ensures that American networks will dominate
programming. Foreign programmes must satisfy American tastes in order to
attract a mass audience and, thus, obtain a sponsor. This has not generally
occurred. Furthermore, the U.S. is a large market which naturally turns to
domestic programming. 7 1 One can only speculate that the U.S. might change
its policy of free flow of information if faced with massive importation of
foreign programming. 72
In carrying out its communications policy, the U.S. relies on the Federal
Communications Commission, similar in function to the CRTC. 78 The FCC
has had to deal with many of the same concerns as the CRTC in its CATV
regulation, particularly the effect of imported television signals on a local
broadcaster's market, and is aware that such imported signals fragment the
local market and drain advertising revenue.7 4 In Canada, the imported signal
is often from a foreign country, so that an international aspect is added to the
regulatory problem. Thus, the FCC can be expected to understand the CRTC's
dilemma. It will also be concerned with preserving harmony between the two
regulatory bodies, which have an ongoing relationship.
Finally, the State Department also has a voice in policy development,
for the problem under discussion affects Canadian-American relations as a
whole, as well as global policy.
71

Price, supra, note 34 at 43.
72That such a change in policy would not be unlikely is shown by the U.S. attitude
to broadcast signals from Mexico directed towards American audiences. When signals
are broadcast from inside the U.S. across the border for retransmission to the U.S., a
special permit from the Federal Communications Commission is necessary (Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)). There has been significant controversy with respect to
stations from Mexico transmitting to Southern California (and draining advertising dollars) by using prerecorded programmes, thus evading § 325(b). See Note, MexicanUnited States BorderBroadcastingDilemma (1973-74), 4 Calif. W. Int. L.. 141.
The U.S. President's Task Force on CommunicationsPolicy, FinalReport (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968) (Rostow Report) at 7-3-4 noted the importance of television in providing an outlet for local expression and advertising, stating as one
of the objectives of communications policy "to preserve the values of localism and to
help build a sense of community, both locally and nationally." The concerns are similar
to those of the Canadian government
7347 U.S.C.
74
See Note,

§ 151.

Radio and Television-Cable Television Operator Subject to Liability
for Copyright Infringement When Distant Signals Are Imported (1974), 87 Harv. L.
Rev. 665; Note, Regulation of Community Antenna Television (1970), 70 Colum. L.
Rev. 837; Note, CATV and Copyright Liability: Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. and The Consensus Agreement (1973-74), 25 Hastings L. 1507.
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Corporations

In discussing the claimants who wish an input into cable television policy
in Canada and the U.S., one cannot ignore the various corporate interests
involved. Most immediately affected are the broadcasters, Canadian and
American. Canadian television stations are being required to provide more
Canadian programming by their government through the CRTC, 75 when the
revenue to finance such programmes is in the United States, as a result of
cable distribution of American television stations. In addition, cable television
companies import the signals of American television stations that often carry
the same programmes for which Canadian stations have paid royalties to
American copyright holders in order to obtain Canadian broadcasting rights.
The result is dilution of the Canadian audience and American stations, with
their larger audiences, attract advertisers sought by the Canadian stations. No
longer are the Canadian stations an attractive investment once their audience
is fragmented by the imported signals. A further reduction in revenue occurs
because advertisers who remain with the Canadian stations pay lower rates,
since advertising rates are calculated according to audience size. Thus, the
Canadian stations must pay royalties for programmes which are shown to the
same audience they seek by foreign stations who have neither been licensed
to serve that audience nor paid royalties for the programmes shown to the
extended audience. Simultaneously, the revenue of the Canadian stations is
reduced at a time when they have obligations to create or purchase original
Canadian programmes. Clearly it is in their interest to have controls on the
76
access of foreign broadcasting.
The American border stations, particularly those in Buffalo and Bellingham, also have an interest in the development of communications policy. As
the figures quoted earlier demonstrate, these stations obtain a great deal of
revenue from Canadian advertisers and from multinational corporations which
are saved from advertising in both Canada and the U.S. They are loath to
lose that established source of revenue.
American networks are interested in the outcome of this dispute, because
it will affect world-wide telecommunications law.77 Any derogation from the
principle of free flow of information jeopardizes their potentially predominant
economic position. Furthermore, Canadian measures are designed to increase
the Canadian voice in television programming, reducing the networks' pro-

75
The requirements are contained in "Canadian content" regulations discussed,
intra, at note 90.
76An eloquent statement of the problem was provided by M. Znaimer in "Why
let U.S. stations dump programs here?" (Globe and Mail, November 5, 1975, at 7).
77Both NBC, CBS, and the Motion Picture Association of America (a major supplier of network programmes) expressed opposition to Canadian cable television policy
when a House of Representatives subcommittee studied the subject (supra, note 59).
The National Association of Broadcasters has been actively lobbying against the Canadian policy. For example, the Executive Committee, in its national convention in March,
1974, passed a resolution to "request the U.S. State Department to use its best offices
to prevent an implementation of the above described policy of the CRTC [commercial
deletion] to the detriment of any U.S. television station" (quoted in U.S. H. of Rep.,

supra, note 59 at 5).
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gramme market and ultimately introducing a competitor. More immediately,
there is a possibility of reduced advertising dollars from multinational cor8
porations on American networks if the spillover to Canada is eliminated."
Cable television operators in Canada are concerned about the developing policy. As the cable television system now operates, no payment is made
for signals transmitted. The cable television undertaking operates a receiver
or antenna that picks up television signals from the air broadcast by television
stations, possibly cleans or strengthens them, and re-transmits them by coaxial
cable or microwave and cable to the homes of subscribers. 7 Revenue comes
from subscription.8 0 To the extent that any settlement might require CATV
to pay for programmes transmitted or to implement costly substitution policies, the existing profit position is imperilled.
Finally, advertisers have an interest in the broadcasting policy developed.
Multinational corporations at present receive a windfall from the spillover of
their American advertisements into Canada. Limitations on the coverage by
American border stations or advertising restrictions would impose new costs
on the multinationals not only for the purchase of advertising time but for
advertisement production as well, since Canadian broadcasting guidelines set
a goal of 70 percent Canadian production for commercials shown in Canada. 8'
Canadian subsidiaries would likely feel the brunt of controls first, as they now
rely on U.S. parents to provide advertising through spilover. With advertising necessary in Canada, the subsidiaries would face new costs. This would
benefit solely Canadian companies who have paid in the past for their advertising, whether in Canada or the U.S.
Canadian advertisers who have been advertising on border stations
claim an input into broadcasting policy, for they allege that there is insufficient time available on Canadian stations for advertising. It is for this reason
that they have been forced to turn to U.S. stations.8 2 Local Canadian broadcasters refute this allegation, particularly those from smaller local stations
such as CITY-TV in Toronto, an independent station broadcasting on UHF. 8
However, these smaller stations cannot offer the advertisers a full substitute
78 As the U.S. broadcasting system now operates, most television stations are affiliated with one of the three national networks (approximately 600 to 680 stations in 1968
according to the President's Task Force Report, supra, note 72 at 7-4). These stations
obtain 20-25 percent of their revenue from the networks for carrying network programmes (id. at 7-21). Networks often sell a programme to one or a few national advertisers. These national advertisers, if multinational corporations, gain from the spillover
to Canada, as do their Canadian subsidiaries.
79 Note, Regulation of Community Antenna Television, supra, note 74.
80
Profits are healthy. A U.S. report calculates the before tax revenue of Canadian
cable operators at $22.5 million in 1973 and an after tax return on equity investment
at 17 percent. See U.S. Congressmen, Report, U.S.-Canadian Relations, April 29, 1976.
81
This is to rise to 80 percent in three years. Monitoring occurs through a commercial registration system (S.O.R. 75/554, s. 9.2). The guidelines by the CRTC, set
out in January, 1976, are discussed in a report by fifteen U.S. Congressmen on U.S.Canadian Relations, id.
82
Can. Sen. Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, supra, note
60, Issue 87, May 19, 1976, at 87:15; Issue 91, June 9, 1976, at 91:49.
83
1 d., Issue 91, testimony of Moses Znaimer, president of CITY-TV, Toronto.
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for border station advertising, for they do not attract the number of viewers
reached by CBLT, the CBC outlet, and CFTO, the CTV outlet in Toronto.
4.

Interest Groups
Various interest groups in both Canada and the United States are interested in contributing to broadcast policy. While established lobbies are in no
way as developed in Canada as in the U.S., certain groups claim a voice in
communications policy. Canadian nationalist groups, such as the Committee
for an Independent Canada, advocate a highly nationalistic policy. Canadian
performers' groups, like the Association of Canadian Television and Radio
Artists,84 wish to increase Canadian programming in order to increase their
employment opportunities.8 5 In contrast, advertising agency groups, such as
the Association of Canadian Advertisers and the Advertising Agency Association of British Columbia, oppose controls for they risk loss of commissions
on advertisements sold for use on U.S. stations.""
The American counterparts of ACTRA, such as AFTRA, the American
Federation of TV and Radio Artists, are just as concerned about job security
and fear loss of work if Canadianization proposals are instituted. 7 Network
groups, including the Motion Picture Association of America and National
Association of Broadcasters, wish to protect the free flow of signals and their
advertising revenue.
F.

FLOW OF DECISIONS

The claims of the various groups involved tend to fall within one of the
two broad policy categories discussed earlier. The Canadian government,
especially the CRTC, wants to protect the financial position of the Canadian
broadcasting industry so as to achieve the larger goal of using the media as
a tool for acculturation and promotion of national unity. Canadian broadcasters want to protect their revenue position and so they, too, favour controls on foreign broadcasts.
The U.S. government and U.S. broadcasters want free access to Canadian
audiences. In particular, they want signals from American broadcasts to reach
the audiences in an unmodified form. The following discussion will deal with
84

Hereinafter referred to as ACTRA. ACTRA is an active lobby, as shown by its

persistent efforts to keep foreign "stars" out of CBC production (Globe and Mail, July
9, 1977, at 1.).
8
5Znaimer, in his article (supra,note 76, col. 2), calculates the effect of the advertising dollar drain on Canadian employment. Assuming $250 million has been drained
off in the last 25 years, he notes that "[t]ranslated into jobs at an industry average of
one job for every $30,000 or so of gross revenue, that's about 8,000 man years of work
for Canadians."
86
Can. Sen. Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, supra, note
60, Issue 91, at 91: 45ff. See, also, U.S. H. of Rep. supra, note 59 at 13. Of the $7 million in advertising revenue from Canadian advertisers paid to Buffalo stations in 1973,
25% remained in Canada as commission for Canadian advertising agencies and sales
representatives.
87 AFTRA, for example, fears the effects of the commercial production guidelines.
See Congressmen's Report, supra, note 80 at 14.
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decisions by various participants that respond to these claims. Rather than
present these decisions in a strictly chronological order, they are organized in
terms of decision-making bodies, for the purpose of this paper is as much to
illustrate the decision-making process as it is to describe the evolution of particular facets of telecommunications law.
1.

CRTC Decisions

The Canadian government has adopted an actively nationalistic policy
with regard to television broadcasting for many years--initially by the federal
Cabinet and Parliament directly and now under the aegis of the CRTC. This
policy has taken several forms. In the 1958 BroadcastingAct, the first restrictions on foreign ownership of broadcast media were introduced.88 These were
not carried over into the 1968 revision of the Act, where the precatory words
of section 3 (b) replaced the statutory requirement of 1958. Foreign ownership restrictions have been maintained in the CRTC's licensing policy.80
In 1972, the CRTC adopted its first "Canadian content" policies. These
required that 60 percent of the programming on a television station be Canadian in origin. On private stations, 50 percent of prime time programming
must be Canadian, while on public stations the requirement is 60 percent.00
In advertising, guidelines suggest a 70 percent Canadian content goal.0 1
Most controversial have been the CRTC's policies directed to cable television. Cable television poses a problem for any broadcasting system, despite
potential benefits which include almost unlimited ability to transmit television
channels and use for other than entertainment purposes, such as information
dispersal and education. CATV threatens the existing structure of the television broadcasting system, which is based on licensing local stations to serve
a designated community. CATV derogates from the value of the local licence
holder's market by importing signals from distant stations. The resulting fragmentation of the audience for the local signal reduces the attractiveness of
the local station for advertisers, especially those with a geographically limited
market. In addition, CATV may also reduce the royalties available to holders
of the copyright to programmes. Normally copyright holders receive royalties
from stations licensed to show their programmes based on the audience
reached, the station being paid by the advertiser according to the number of
viewers. Where the advertiser refuses to pay for an extended audience reached
by CATV because those reached are not a valuable market for him, the station will be unwilling and unable to pay increased royalties to the copyright
holder. This would not be too serious if the extended CATV coverage did not
harm the copyright holder, but this does not appear to be the case. Rather,
88

BroadcastingAct, S.C. 1958, c. 22, s. 14.
89 This is in response to a Cabinet Direction to the CRTC regarding foreign licensees, S.O.R./71-33 as amended by S.O.R./75-102.
9OSee Television Broadcasting Regulations, S.O.R./64-50, as amended by S.O.R./
71-558, S.O.R./72-242 and S.O.R./75-554.
The Canadian content regulations discussed here are found at S.O.R./72-242, s. 3
amending s. 6A of the Television Broadcasting Regulations.
91 Supra, note 81.
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market for the
the extended coverage would seem to reduce the secondary
92
copyright holder to sell second runs of programmes.
While CATV is a problem for any broadcasting system, it is additionally
so in Canada. The effect of the CATV system in Canada, as in the U.S., is to
undermine the local licence. Because of the predominance of American signals carried, it also risks undermining the whole Canadian broadcasting policy
and its goal of Canadianization.
Canadian policy with regard to cable television has undergone substantial revision over the last few years. Until 1968, the regulation of CATV was
left to the Department of Transport, which adopted a highly permissive policy
93
in licensing, granting a licence so long as one Canadian channel was carried.
Then, in 1968, the BroadcastingAct accorded the CRTC the power to regulate CATV by defining "broadcasting undertakings," which are subject to4
licence by the CRTC, to include a "broadcasting receiving undertaking."'9
Judicial interpretation of this phrase has held that CATV operations fall within the category of "broadcasting receiving undertaking." 95 The CRTC first
exercised its mandate with regard to CATV in a policy statement issued on
May 13, 1969.98
The first principle set out in the statement dealt with programme distribution, with the CRTC setting out a priority list for channels to be carried,
headed by CBC French and English stations, followed by private Canadian
networks, independent Canadian networks, local and educational programming, and ending with non-Canadian television stations and duplicate channels. At this time the CRTC forbade any alteration in programming received
from broadcasting stations without CRTC approval. No commercial messages
were allowed other than those carried in the signals received.
This policy statement was followed by another on December 3, 1969,
92
These problems are discussed in greater detail in B. Silverman, CATV and Copyright Liability: Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc. and the Consensus Agreement, supra, note 74 at 1527-30. Even if the copyright holder is not directly
harmed by the extended coverage by CATV, one might consider the equities of the use
of the television signals without compensation therefor by the CATV operation. If copyright law is designed to protect private property, then some compensation seems due.
If such law is designed to protect creativity in order to encourage further creativity,
then there may be no justification for such compensation if no harm to the copyright
holder results from the extended signals. This dilemma is discussed in the Silverman
Note, as well as the Note in the Harvard Law Review cited supra, note 74.
93 CRTC, Annual Report, 1969-70, Appendix 4, at 347, 348. A change occurred in
mid-1964, when it was decided that the Board of Broadcast Governors (the predecessor
of the CRTC) should be consulted on all new CATV licence applications so as to determine the impact on broadcasting in Canada.
94
Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11, s. 2.
95
Terra Communications Ltd. v. Communicomp Data Ltd. (1974), 1 O.R. (2d)
682 (H.C.); R. v. Communicomp Data Ltd. (1975), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 213 (Ont. Co.
Ct.); R. v. Maahs (1975), 6 O.R. (2d) 774 (Dist. Ct.), Capital Cities Communications
Inc. v. CanadianRadio-Television Commission (S.C.C. unreported, Nov. 30, 1977), at
26 per Laskin CJ.
96 CRTC, "Public Announcement - Community Antenna Television," reprinted in
CRTC, Annual Report, 1969-70, Appendix 5, at 336.
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which was directly concerned with the impact of U.S. television coverage in
Canada through CATV.97 The CRTC decided in this statement that it would
not license any CATV system based on microwave, 98 or any other technical
system for the wholesale importation of programmes from U.S. stations. For
the first time the CRTC discussed the need to stop the accelerating trend towards expansion of American television coverage in Canada in order to preserve the Canadian broadcasting system. As the Commission concluded,
Broadcasting in Canada can and must express the originality of Canada and Cana-

dians. The commission is determined that the hope and spirit embodied in the
Broadcasting Act of 1968 will be successfully achieved. 90

At this time the CRTC took no steps to encourage in an active manner the
development of Canadian programmes.
A further policy statement of April 10, 1970, repeated this concern about
the broadcasting system. Nevertheless, it declared that in the future a CATV
operator could use microwave or other broadband systems to receive one
commercial non-Canadian station and one non-commercial non-Canadian
station.
By February, 1971, the CRTC had determined that there was a need
for extensive review of CATV policy in Canada. Rather than opt for totally unfettered growth in CATV or total restriction thereon, the CRTC chose to pursue a policy of integrating CATV into the broadcasting system as a whole.' 00
It issued a policy paper at this time which was the subject of public hearings
in Montreal starting on April 26, 1971. Following this, on July 16, 1971, the
CRTC issued its most significant policy statement to date, "Canadian Broadcasting-A Single System." The statement noted the problems caused by
CATV, both in the derogation of the economic base of the local licensee and
in the thwarting of the policy of local licensing. Licences are issued to broadcasting stations partly on the assumption that they will serve a local community's needs. The 'logic' of this local licence is destroyed when CATV
imports television signals from outside the community that fail to respond to
the locality's interests and needs. The CRTC went on to adopt five basic policies which it felt would be consistent with the objectives of the Broadcasting
Act, the creation of a single system, and the strengthening of the Canadian cultural, political, social, and economic fabric. First, the CRTC set out a priority
list of basic services that a CATV operation would be required to supply, starting with local stations, regional stations, and distant stations, all defined as
Canadian. Any other stations are "optional" and may be carried only if basic
9

7 CRTC, "Public Announcement The Improvement and Development of Canadian Broadcasting and the Extension of U.S. Television Coverage in Canada by CATV"
in CRTC, Annual Report, 1969-70, Appendix 5, at 342.
98
Microwave is used to carry television signals over a long distance when the use
of cable would be much more expensive.
99
Supra, note 96 at 243.
100 This is consistent with the broadcasting policy expressed by Parliament in the
Broadcasting Act, which refers to broadcasting undertakings (including broadcasting
receiving undertakings) as a single system (s. 3 (a)).
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services have been provided. 101 Second, the CRTC encouraged the CATV
operator to provide access to a channel for community programming. Third,
the CRTC concluded that CATV operators who earn a sufficient gross revenue
per mile of cable (a sum not calculated in the statement) should pay for the
Canadian programmes used on a basis to be worked out by CATV operators
and local stations. According to the CRTC, "the basic principle involved is:
one should pay for what he uses to operate his business." Fourth, and most
importantly, the CRTC adopted two policies designed to restore the logic of
the local licence: programme substitution and commercial deletion.'1 2 In
adopting these two policies, the CRTC for the first time authorized CATV
operators to alter television signals received.
The programme substitution policy allows the highest priority station to
request the deletion of the signals of a programme from another station identical to one which it is broadcasting in the same time period or within one
week of its broadcast. In the latter case, the broadcaster must pay for the substitution. The rationale for this policy is that local stations (or perhaps regional) are protected from fragmentation of their audiences. This prevents
their advertising clients from protesting about a reduced number of viewers
caused by CATV operations. The public is unaffected, for they see the same
programmes as before.'0 3 All that is affected is the more distant station, which
is not licensed to serve the viewing area in the first place. A problem arises,
however, in that a distant station, even though not licensed to serve the area,
may have structured its operations on the assumption that this extended market would be reached and have come to rely on the revenue built up within
that structure. Abstract discussions of licensing do not provide them with
much comfort.' 04
More controversial is the commercial deletion policy, whereby CATV
operators can remove the commercials in the signals of stations not licensed
to serve Canada, while continuing to transmit the programmes of those stations. In the space left by the deletion, the CATV operator can substitute
commercials sold by Canadian television stations, provided that the CATV
operator and broadcaster have entered into an agreement to this effect approved by the CRTC. The underlying rationale, although not expressed, is
that Canadian broadcasters will benefit from new sources of revenue as advertisers are attracted to the wider market in Canada or driven away from
101 The definitions of local, regional, and distant stations are designed to ensure
that the CATV operator carries local broadcasters, as well as coverage of at least one
CBC and one private Canadian station and carriage of an educational channel if a
province requests this service.
102 CRTC, supra, note 4 at 21. It is this policy which seems especially illogical to

American broadcasters, since American programmes continue to be seen. See, for ex-

ample, testimony of Leslie Arries of WBEN-TV, Buffalo in U.S. H. of Rep., supra,
note 59 at 15.
103 Although their chance to choose the time at which they wish to view them may
be restricted. Rather than pay the cost of programme substitution at various times in the
week if the U.S. and Canadian programmes are shown at different times, Canadian stations have chosen to broadcast their version of programmes in the same time slot as the
U.S. broadcasters (Globe and Mail, December 20, 1976, at 13, col. 3).
10This is the feeling of broadcasters in Buffalo and Bellingham.
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American stations on which their ads are no longer seen. In turn, the Canadian broadcasters will be expected to use their new revenue in order to produce
Canadian programming.
There is no effort under this commercial deletion policy to control the
Canadian content of broadcasts or of cable television coverage or to force
Canadian production, although indirectly there is an obligation to use the revenue to produce Canadian programmes through the interaction of the present
policy with existing Canadian content rules. Nevertheless, American programmes continue to be seen, whether on Canadian or American stations. Rather
than try to eliminate American programming, a move that would be politically unfeasible in light of the widespread popularity of such programmes in
Canada, the CRTC chose to adopt a policy aimed at increasing Canadian
access to programming by increasing the economic resources available therefor. In some ways, an analogy could be made between the commercial deletion
policy and a protective tariff. The advertisements accompanying American
television programme signals are an economic good, in which trade will be
restricted in order to protect a domestic product. The Canadian economy has
traditionally been rife with protective tariffs imposed to protect domestic industry from international competition. 10 5
An interesting addendum was found in the fourth prong of the CATV
policy, in the CRTC's request to the Canadian government for an amendment
to the Income Tax Act to prohibit deduction of advertising expenses incurred
by Canadian taxpayers who purchase advertising time on non-Canadian stations. 106 Again the CRTC did not explain its purpose, but one can discern it
with little difficulty. The aim is to render advertising on American stations as
-unattractive as possible for those advertisers wishing to reach Canadian audiences. Thus, elimination of the tax deduction increases the cost of the advertisement while commercial deletion means that there is a substantial risk that
a purchased advertisement will never be shown in Canada.
The CRTC's policy statement continued with certain provisions addressed to licensing and to strengthening cable television, finishing with a lengthy
discussion of the need for a Canadian programme production industry. The
CRTC's perspective on this whole issue is probably best illustrated by the
final sentence of the document.
The effect of this [U.S. presence] can tend, at times, to be overwhelming. In the
face of such affluence and influence, the creative development and perpetuation of

105 The danger with the "tariff" on television advertisements, as with any protective
tariff, is that it will safeguard inefficiency or second-rate productions. The analogy to
tariffs breaks down, to some extent, in the way in which the commercial deletion policy
was implemented (infra, note 109). By authorizing random deletion of commercials, the
CRTC could not say that the deletion parallelled a tariff, for tariffs are imposed on a
class of goods, not a few items within a class chosen at random. Still, the tariff principle
could be salvaged, for the random deletion is similar to a quota. Unfortunately, such a
practice is prohibited under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr),
Article XI (1), which bars import restrictions other than duties. See also H. Steiner and
D. Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems (Mineola: The Foundation Press, 1968) at
1049-1051.
0

' 6 The

request was answered by Bill C-58. See discussion, infra, at note 168.
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a Canadian programme industry
is mandatory if Canada is to survive a culturaly autonomous nation.lo 7

Whether melodramatic or not, the statement illustrates the depth of CRTC
commitment to its Canadianization policy. The commercial deletion policy
has been by far the most controversial adopted in implementation of this
objective. It was not until December, 1972, that it was first implemented. At
that time, a Calgary CATV operator's licence was amended on the condition
that commercial signals from American stations, specifically in Spokane,
Washington, be deleted and advertisements of local broadcasters with whom
the licensee had an approved agreement be substituted. 08 Similar conditions
were subsequently imposed on CATV operators in Montreal, the Maritimes,
and the West. 1 9
In August, 1973, Rogers Cable Television Company of Toronto began
to delete commercials from the Buffalo station WKBW-TV on a random basis.
Protests from the Buffalo broadcasters led Rogers, along with two other
CATV companies, Coaxial Colourview Ltd. and Bramalea Telecable Ltd.,
to apply to the CRTC for an amendment to their broadcast licences on
October 16, 1973, to allow deletion of commercials on a random basis and
substitution of special promotional messages and general public interest messages. A licence amendment would make such deletion a legal obligation on
Rogers' part. This would no doubt protect the CATV operator in any subsequent litigation with the Buffalo stations by providing a legal justification for
Rogers' action. The three Buffalo stations immediately intervened in a public
hearing held by the CRTC on November 27, 1973, claiming that Rogers'
action violated the Copyright Actl" the Trade Marks Act," and common
law rules against unfair competition, unjust enrichment, conspiracy to injure,
and interference with contractual relations. Despite these protestations, the
CRTC amended the licences, in part as requested. 1 Random deletion of
commercial signals would be allowed under the licence, on the ground discussed above, that the CRTC's objective was to restore the logic of the local
licence and strengthen Canadian television service. The requested form of
substitution was denied, however. No promotional material was to be inserted;
rather, public service announcements were to serve as replacements. Finally,
the Rogers' licence alone was the subject of a condition barring voluntary
settlement of any litigation between the licensee and the Buffalo broadcasters
unless prior approval was obtained from the CRTC. This condition was explained as arising out of the fear that the licensee might agree to a settlement
which would make it unable to carry out its obligations under the Broadcasting Act.
The Rogers' decision was the catalyst that brought the Canadian courts
into the development of CATV policy, for the Buffalo stations, WKBW-TV,
10 7 CRTC, supra, note 4 at 44.

108 Supra, note 3.
109 CRTC, Annual Report, 1975-76 at 18.
11" R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30.
"'lR.S.C. 1970, c. T-10.
112
CRTC Decisions 74-100, 74-101, 74-102.
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Taft Broadcasting and Capital Cities Communications, sought judicial review
of the licensing decision and also appealed it.118 Before turning to the judicial
response, it may be of interest to note CRTC decisions since Rogers'. New
licences continued to be issued with a commercial deletion condition,11 4 and
the CRTC showed its continuing concern about the effect of CATV on Canadian broadcasting with a further policy statement issued in December, 1975.115
It set out objectives for CATV operators: to contribute to the quality and
diversity of Canadian broadcasting and programme production industries and
to contribute to community programming. Regulations were issued to restrict
the carriage of non-Canadian FM radio stations.1 1
Throughout this period, the CRTC continued to take a position in favour
of actions that would foster a Canadian programme production industry. To
carry out its objective, it adopted several policies that complement and reinforce each other, including foreign ownership controls, Canadian content
regulations, and CATV controls that restore the logic of the local licence and
undercut the financial advantage of foreign broadcasters. The effect of these
CRTC decisions on the law relating to cable television depended, and continues to depend, on decisions by other participants in the political sphere
and in the judiciary.
2.

The Courts
Frustrated by inactivity in the political and diplomatic arenas, the Buffalo
broadcasters resorted to litigation in an effort to shape telecommunications
law, challenging the CRTC licence amendments on administrative law and
constitutional law bases, and suing Rogers and others for violations of copyright and trademark legislation. Litigation and lobbying are two of the few
mechanisms open to the individual to influence the law. At the time that the
broadcasters turned to the courts, lobbying seemed to be achieving nothing.
It was thought that litigation might expedite negotiations for settlement and
might also establish a precedent
that would frustrate or deter the implemen1
tation of the Canadian policy. 1T
Shortly after the CRTC amended Rogers' cable television licence in
May, 1974, the three Buffalo television stations, Capital Cities Communications Inc., Taft Broadcasting Co., and WBEN-TV Inc., sought relief in the
Federal Court of Canada, claiming that the licence was invalid on several
grounds: first, Parliament had no constitutional authority to regulate the con113 Judicial review was sought under s. 28 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970,
2nd Supp., c. 10. The appeal was pursuant to s. 26 of the BroadcastingAct.
l14 For example, Decisions 75-151 and 75-152 require QCTV Ltd. and Capital
Cable TV Ltd. (Edmonton) to make a commercial deletion and substitution agreement
prior to distributing signals from a Spokane station.
115 CRTC, Policies Respecting Broadcasting Receiving Undertakings (Cable Tele-

vision), December 16, 1975.

110 CRTC, Annual Report, 1975-76 at 2-4, 17. The cable television regulations are
found in SOR/75-665, s. 6 (television service priorities) and s. 15 (radio service priorities).
117 See the testimony of Leslie Arries, Vice-President and General Manager of
WBEN-TV of Buffalo before the U.S. H. of Rep. Subcommittee on Inter-American

Affairs, supra,note 59 at 14.
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tent of signals carried by a CATV operation within a province; second, the
CRTC exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the licence; third, the licence was
contrary to the Inter-AmericanRadio-CommunicationsConvention of 1937.118
A decision in the case was issued by the Federal Court of Appeal on
January 17, 1975, dismissing the application for judicial review and the appeal."19 Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted March
17, 1975, and a decision was finally rendered, dismissing the appeal by Capital Cities, on November 30, 1977.120

By the time the Supreme Court of Canada delivered its decision, the
dispute over commercial deletion on CATV had been temporarily settled by
political means. 121 This does not leave the court's decision without significance in the context of the present discussion of international communications
law. Substantively, the decision's effect is to preserve the future jurisdiction
of the federal government and that of its regulatory arm, the CRTC, should
there be a desire to reactivate the commercial deletion policy. If the appellants had succeeded in proving that the federal Parliament had no constitutional authority to regulate cable television, CATV would have become
subject to provincial regulation. Such regulation might have been more favourable to American broadcast interests, at least in some provinces.12 2 Even if
unfavourable, there would be some delay in implementing provincial regulatory schemes, giving American broadcasters further opportunity to attract
Canadian advertising dollars.
Thus, the Supreme Court's adjudication of the Capital Cities case involved the court in the international law-making process. Canadian judges
do not regard themselves as political actors, and they have often been criticized for their positivistic approach to law.123 Yet in the Capital Cities case,
they have played an important law-making role, both domestically and internationally.
It is the domestic ramifications of the Capital Cities case, rather than the
118U.S.T.S. 938 (1937).

119
Re Capital Cities Communications and CanadianRadio-Television Commission
(1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 415.
120 Capital Cities Communications, supra, note 95. See, also, La Rigie des Services
Public de la Province de Quebec v. Dionne decided at the same time. In both cases, the
court divided 6 to 3, with Laskin CJ.C., writing the majority opinion (with Martland,
'udson, Ritchie, Spence and Dickson JJ. concurring) and Pigeon J. writing the dissent
(Beetz and de Grandprd HI. concurring). The Dionne case dealt with the constitutionality
of provincial licensing of cable distribution systems, holding that such licensing was ultra
vires the province.
121 See text, infra, at note 178.
122
For example, Ontario, where the minority Conservative government made an
effort, unsuccessfully this time, to allow Ontario companies to make tax deductions for
advertisements purchased in the U.S. directed to a Canadian market. This is contrary
to the federal government policy prohibiting such deductions from federal income tax
(infra, note 168). The measure was withdrawn after opposition parties registered their
disagreement with the provision. (Globe and Mail, December 1, 1977).
123 See, for example, P. Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making (1968),
46 Can. B. Rev. 406. The emphasis is on precedent, rather than policy arguments.
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international, which appear to have been the concern of the court. The question of constitutional authority over the technology and content of cable television is one that has preoccupied the federal and provincial governments
over the last several years.' 2 4 Neither broadcasting nor cable television is
mentioned expressly as a subject of legislative power attributed to either the
federal or provincial governments under the Canadian constitution, 125 for, of

course, neither existed in 1867 when that document was drafted. However,
the federal government claims authority to regulate the field on two bases:
first, the residuary power contained in the opening words of section 91 of
the British North America Act, "to make laws for the Peace, Order and good
Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the
Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the
Provinces;" and second, under the combination of subsection 91 (29) and
the exception to provincial powers over local works and undertakings found
in paragraph 92 (10) (a) of ".

..

Telegraphs, and other Works and Under-

takings connecting the Province with any other or others of the Province, or
extending beyond the limits of the Province." It has been the contention of
some provinces, in refutation of the federal claim, that cable television is a
local matter, detached from broadcasting in general, and falling within subsection 92 (10), "local Works and Undertakings." They regarded the distribution, through coaxial cables, of television signals received by the antennae
of a CATV operation as separable, for purposes of constitutional jurisdiction,
from the reception of the signals. Other provinces argued that the subject of
cable television has aspects falling within various heads of both sections 91
and 92 of the British North America Act. For example, regulation of the
importation of foreign television signals would fall to federal jurisdiction under
the authority to regulate trade and commerce.1 28

Laskin C.J.C., in his majority judgment, rejected the argument that the
jurisdiction over cable television distribution of imported television signals
was divided between the federal and provincial governments.' 2 7 Emphasizing
repeatedly that the scope of constitutional jurisdiction over broadcasting
should not be determined on the basis of technology, the Chief Justice held
that cable television systems receiving television signals constitute an undertaking extending beyond the province. They are integrally related to television
124 Evidence of the constitutional importance of the case was shown by the intervention of five provincial governments in the Capital Cities case: Ontario, Quebec,
Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan. Interestingly, several important constitutional cases in the Supreme Court of Canada in the last few years have been set in
motion by American litigants - Morgan v. A.G. P.E.I. (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 527
(alien land controls); Canadian Industrial Gas and Oil Ltd., v. Saskatchewan (S.C.C.
unreported, November 23, 1977) (resource taxation); Amax Potash Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (1977), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (potash industry nationalization). This seems to be a
new trend, for in the past the parties to constitutional cases have tended to be federal
and provincial governments.
125 British North America Act, 1867, 30 and 31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 91 and 92.
12
6Section 91 (2). This was Saskatchewan's argument in the Supreme Court in the
Capital Cities case (see Laskin CJ.C. in Capital Cities, supra, note 95 at 21.) Pigeon J.
adopted this argument as the basis for federal jurisdiction over imported television
signals (id. at 3).
127 Id.at 16-17.
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broadcasts and so fall within federal jurisdiction through the operation of
s. 92 (10) (a) of the B.N.A. Act. 128 The Chief Justice refused to accept the
argument that the reception of television signals by the CATV system's
antenna should be regarded as separate from the subsequent distribution of
those signals, saying,
The system depends upon a telecast for its operation, and is no more than a conduit for signals from the telecast, interposing
itself through a different technology
129
to bring the telecast to paying subscribers.

Since federal jurisdiction over broadcasting extends to regulation of the signals received directly by home receivers, the Chief Justice concluded that the
jurisdiction must encompass the same signals picked up by CATV systems
and transmitted to home receivers through coaxial cable.'8 0
In making his decision, the Chief Justice remained faithful to the decision of the Privy Council in Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada.1 1 In that case, Viscount Dunedin, writing for the Board,

held that radio communication was a matter subject to regulation by the
federal Parliament both under the opening words of section 91 and under
paragraph 92 (10) (a).132 His Lordship's decision seems to have been based
on structural considerations as to which level of government could best control broadcasting, rather than on the rigid words of the text, for he speaks
of the "necessity" for the federal government to regulate broadcasting in
order to fulfill its international obligations under the 1927 International
Radiotelegraphic Convention. Certain words which His Lordship chose have

been referred to frequently in subsequent cases, and were quoted by Laskin
C.J.C. in the Capital Cities case: "[blroadeasting as a system cannot exist
without both a transmitter and receiver." In other words, the two cannot be
separated for purposes of regulation. 83 This was the approach adopted by
2

81Id. at 16. "The systems are clearly undertakings which reach out beyond the
Province in which their physical apparatus is located; and, even more than in the
Winner case, they each constitute a single undertaking which deals with the very signals
which come to each of them from across the border and transmit those signals, albeit
through a conversion process, through its cable system to subscribers."
129 Id. at 17.
130 The majority opinion may seem limited to a decision as to federal competence
to regulate cable television systems receiving foreign television signals (id. at 16.) However, further discussion seems to recognize federal competence over cable television
whenever television signals are received, whether from within or without a province (id.
at 17-18). Possible provincial competence is reserved to CATV systems limiting their
operation to locally produced programmes for local subscribers (id. at 9). See, also, Laskin
C.C. in Dionne, supra, note 120 explaining Capital Cities at 3, 4.

8a1
[1932] A.C. 304, aff'g [1931] S.C.R. 541.

1 2

a The Radio case, at first appearance, seems to accord jurisdiction to the federal
Parliament by interpreting the opening words of s. 91 ("Peace, Order and good Government") to give the Parliament any legislative authority necessary to implement treaties.
That interpretation was rejected by the Privy Council in the subsequent Labour Conventions case (A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont., [1937] A.C. 326 at 351.) There the Board explained
the Radio case, saying that legislative jurisdiction over broadcasting fell to Parliament
through the operation of the residuary clause of s. 91, neither s. 91 nor s. 92 having
dealt with the matter.
138 Radio Reference, supra, note 131 at 314-15.
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Laskin C.J.C. in CapitalCities: CATV is linked to television and radio transmitters in an inextricable manner, carrying television and radio signals to
34
the home receiver.

An argument could be made that radio and television broadcasting differ
in nature from cable television, in that the latter is physically confined to a
wire or cable and not likely to interfere with transmissions by other broadcasting undertakings in the way that radio and television signals passing
through the atmosphere do. Thus, there is not the equivalent need for a single
regulating authority which was the concern of the Privy Council in the Radio
Reference.13 5 Furthermore, from a policy standpoint, the provinces have a
significant interest in regulating CATV because of its educational uses (education is a provincial concern under section 93) and community uses (arguably within subsection 92 (16) as a matter of a local nature). 86 The Supreme
Court of Canada, however, rejected such arguments in light of the degree of
operational integration between cable television and television broadcasting
and the dependence of cable television on television for its existence.
The discussion to this point has focused on federal control of the technology of cable television. The appellants and the provincial Attorneys-General supporting them (Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, British Columbia) directed
their attack to federal control over the content of cable television. 37 Pigeon I.
in his dissent in the Dionne case, released at the same time as Capital Cities,
would make a distinction between federal control over licensing of the technical aspects of CATV systems and content control, the latter not falling within
exclusive federal jurisdiction. 38 Laskin CJ.C. had no doubts as to federal
184 Supra, note 95 at 17.
135 See, for example, Lerner J. in Terra Communications, supra, note 95 at 693.

See, also, other lower court decisions discussing constitutional jurisdiction over CATV:
Re Public Utilities Commission and Victoria Cablevision Ltd. (1965), 51 D.L.R. (2d)
716 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Communicomp Data Ltd., supra, note 95 at 230-31; R. v. Maahs,
supra, note 95 at 780; . Fine. Whither Goes the Wire? The Extent of Federal Competence to Regulate CATV (1972), 18 McGill L.. 615 at 623.
138 Quebec is especially concerned with the use of communications for creating
community awareness and has rejected federal claims to control communications. The
earlier discussion of the uses of communications (supra, section B) should demonstrate
the importance of control of the broadcast media to the Parti Qu6becois government in
its efforts to foster Francophone identity and to promote support for Quebec independence.
137The constitutional auestion of which the provincial Attorneys-General were
given notice was phrased as follows:
Whether the Broadcasting Act, RSC 1970, c. B-11, and regulations made thereunder, are ultra vires the Parliament of Canada insofar as they purport to regulate, or to authorize the Canadian Radio-Television Commission to license and
regulate the content of programs carried by CATV systems situated wholly within
Provincial boundaries. (Per Laskin C.J.C. in Capital Cities, supra, note 95 at 7.
Emphasis added).
13
8Dionne, supra, note 120 at 13, 15. Pigeon I. acknowledged exclusive federal
control over the technical aspects of radio communications, including CATV. He would
leave content control and economic aspects to the provinces. Pigeon I. leaves open a
door for federal control over content when he assumes that the CRTC could deny a
licence to a CATV system meeting all technical requirements under the Radio Act (id. at
14). Surely, one could challenge the CRTC's jurisdiction to do so, for the decision would
be based on irrelevant considerations.
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competence to regulate content, at least when foreign television signals are
distributed. 13 9
Programme content regulation is inseparable from regulating the undertaking
40
through which programmes are received and sent on as part of the total enterprise.'

The reasoning underlying this conclusion is not too clear, for it rests, in part,
on traditional federal authority to license radio receivers, a basis which does
not appear to lead to a conclusion that Parliament can regulate the content
of material received. 141 The conclusion would be more convincing had His
Lordship looked to a rationale for content control by the federal Parliament,
based on the scarcity of broadcast frequencies. Frequencies available for
broadcasting are limited, and the federal Parliament must decide on a way
to allocate them between competing users. The method chosen has been
through licences issued to those most capable of meeting national policies
for broadcasting. Once those licensees commence operations, their ability to
function must be preserved, either by ensuring some degree of profitability
or through public subsidy. The Canadian government, having chosen a commercial model for broadcasting, must ensure that model is viable. Cable television, by importing television signals from unlicensed stations, threatens the
commercial viability of licensed stations. Therefore, one can argue that Parliament must regulate content of the cable television systems at least to the
extent that those systems wish to pick up television signals in order to protect
the structure of the broadcasting system. 1 2
This suggested rationale would not accord the extensive federal jurisdiction over cable television that Laskin C.J.C. recognizes. The Chief Justice
would apparently leave open for possible provincial jurisdiction programmes
originatedby CATV systems and seemingly if that was all that those systems
transmitted. 143 Otherwise, federal legislative authority would be exclusive
with regard to CATV systems transmitting television signals. The rationale
suggested would allow the federal Parliament competence to regulate use and
maximum number of signals if (but only if) CATV systems chose to receive
them. Otherwise, CATV would be subject to provincial jurisdiction.
The appellants fared badly in their constitutional challenge, and their
challenge to the validity of the CRTC decision on jurisdictional grounds did
not fare any better. The appellants argued that the BroadcastingAct gave the
CRTC no authority to regulate CATV, an argument that Laskin C.J.C. re139 Supra, note 130.
140 Capital Cities, supra, note 95 at 20.
141 Id. at 19. Laskin C..C. noted that the federal government had in the past
licensed broadcasting receivers. He questioned the constitutional basis for doing so, if
Parliament did not have authority to regulate broadcasting content. Surely, one reason
for doing so could be to raise revenue. Furthermore, such a statement, that Parliament
had licensed receivers, does not prove that Parliament in fact had constitutional authority to do so.
142 Pigeon .. in his dissent in Dionne says that economic repercussions cannot form
a basis for legislative Jurisdiction (supra, note 120 at 14). With all due respect, such
repercussions must be relevant, thoueh not conclusive, both in trade and commerce cases
and in deciding the scope of jurisdiction over a matter such as broadcasting.
143 Supra, note 130.
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jected. He found that CATV is a "broadcasting receiving undertaking" within section 2 of the Act and so subject to CRTC licensing and regulatory
authority.144 Furthermore, he rejected an argument that the CRTC fettered
its discretion in relying on the policy statement of July 16, 1971, to justify
the commercial deletion condition to the Rogers' licence. 145
The only issue on which the appellants succeeded was the challenge to
the condition in Rogers' licence forbidding settlement without CRTC approval. 140 Laskin C.J.C. found it difficult to accept the CRTC's explanation
that the condition was imposed because a settlement could jeopardize Rogers'
ability to carry out its obligations under the Broadcasting Act. Surely the
licensee would be wary of any settlement that might undermine its capacity
to fulfil its obligations or that might violate its licence, as it would risk penalties such as licence revocation. Since the court severed this part of the order,
the appellants do not seem to have gained a great deal.
The appellants' final submission, based on the Inter-American Radio
Communications Convention of 1937, forced the court to be aware of its
international role. Article 11 of the Convention recognizes the right of states
to assign radio frequencies to broadcasting stations, provided that no interference is caused to the service of another country. Article 21 requires contracting governments to take appropriate measures to ensure that broadcasts
will not be retransmitted or rebroadcast without previous authorization of the
station of origin. Laskin C.J.C. found no obstacle to the commercial deletion
order to the CATV licensees in either article. Article 11, he held, was concerned with elimination of technical interference, not programming. 47 This
would seem consistent with early approaches to international regulation of
telecommunications, which focused on frequency allocation and use. 48
More difficulty arises with Article 21. Laskin CJ.C. would adopt the
reasoning of Ryan J.A. in the Federal Court of Appeal, narrowing the Convention's application to rebroadcasts of broadcasting stations, not CATV
systems, which are "broadcasting receiving undertakings."' 49 This may be
somewhat weak reasoning, when the court had just found CATV integrally
related to broadcasting stations for licensing purposes. Furthermore, the Chief
Justice pointed out that Article 21 contemplates implementation of governCapital Cities, supra, note 95 at 26, 28.
145 Id. at 32. Pigeon J. rested his decision in Capital Cities on the fact that the
CRTC exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering commercial deletion (id. at 8, 17).
1
46 Id.at 29.
147Id. at 36.
148 Leroy, supra, note 8 at 736. See also Whiteman (1968), 9 Digest of International
Law at 764. The Chief Justice also found that Rogers was not bound by the Convention, since it was a licensee under the Broadcasting Act, rather than the Radio Act,
which implemented the Convention (Capital Cities, supra, note 95 at 37).
149 id. at 37. Article 21 reads, in part, "[t]he contracting Governments shall take
appropriate measures to ensure that no program transmitted by a broadcasting station
may be retransmitted or rebroadcast, in whole or in part, by any other station without
the previous authorization of the station of origin."
[Emphasis added.]
144
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ment measures to prevent interference. Here, there is no prohibition on interference with foreign broadcasts; 150 in fact, although Laskin C.J.C. does not
point this out, there is government instruction, through the CRTC, to alter
broadcasts. Pigeon J., in dissent, did find a violation of Article 21,1"1 and
held that even if the treaty had no domestic force, the CRTC could not
52
authorize licence conditions in violation of Canadian treaty obligations.
This position shows much greater awareness of the international law aspects
of the case than does that of the Chief Justice.
In sum, the commercial deletion policy emerged intact from the Supreme
Court of Canada. This has left the American broadcasters with the decision
whether to proceed with a second phase of litigation, pending at the trial
level of the Federal Court, which focuses on industrial property issues. One
statement of Thurlow J.A. in the Federal Court of Appeal in the Capital
Cities case will be of concern in this new litigation. In a concurring opinion,
Thurlow J.A. questioned the right of Capital Cities to standing in the case on
the ground that its rights were not affected by Rogers' licence. Since radio
frequencies are public property in Canada under section 3 (a) of the Broadcasting Act and since Capital Cities is unlicensed in Canada, Thurlow J.A.
held that Capital Cities could not acquire any right either in the frequency or
in the signals generated on it.1 3 Thurlow J.A.'s approach may give cause for
concern for, if extrapolated, it seems to deny a proprietary interest to anyone
operating in a place without authorization. While the appellants have no right
to claim the use of the frequency in Canada, it is difficult to see how they
lose the ownership of their signals, even when "usurping" Canadian frequencies. Laskin C.J.C. did not deal with the property rights issue, finding that
there was standing because Ryan J.A., with Urie l.A. concurring, did not
raise the issue and because of Capital Cities'
interest in protecting the commercials associated with its programmes. 54
The proprietary rights in the programmes broadcast and the commercials
contained therein have relevance to all cable television, partly because the
decision as to whether CATV transmission infringes copyright or constitutes
unfair competition is of interest to all television broadcasters. The television
companies argue that CATV transmission of their signals constitutes a violation of the Copyright Act.155 American nationals can claim the protection
of the Act by operation of the Universal Copyright Convention,'56 of which
both Canada and the U.S. are signatories. It would seem that the plaintiffs
will face a difficult task in convincing a court that CATV transmission constitutes a "performance" for purposes of copyright infringement. The only
1lId. at 38.
151 Id. at 14. The CATV systems are either interfering with broadcasts (if mere
conduits) or retransmitting programmes.

152 1d. at 17.

' 58 Supra, note 119 at 417.
154 Capital Cities, supra, note 95 at 8.

155 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, s. 3 (1).
150 216 U.N.T.S. 132 (No. 2937). Article H provides for national treatment for the
nationals of any contracting state.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 15, NO. 3

Canadian authority on CATV is the case of Canadian Admiral Corp. V.
Rediffusion, Inc.,157 a decision of the Exchequer Court, which held that cable
transmission to subscribers of a live football telecast, as well as films thereof,
was not a "performance in public" for purposes of the Copyright Act. The
transmissions constituted a performance, but not one "in public," when transmissions were to home receivers. While one might argue that the decision is
not a weighty precedent in light of the extensive developments in CATV
technology since its delivery in 1954 and because it was only a decision at
the trial court level, the likelihood of a finding of copyright liability today
seems doubtful.
The United States Supreme Court in two relatively recent cases, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television Inc.158 and Teleprompter Corp. v.
Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc.,159 concluded that CATV operations are
not liable to pay copyright royalties. The majority in each case employed a
functional approach, concluding that CATV operations fulfill the same function as the viewer's antenna or television set, a conclusion that the Supreme
60
Court of Canada reached in Capital Cities, after quoting from Fortnightly.1
The CATV operations do not "perform" as do broadcasters, even when, as
part of their service, they mix signals from various stations, provide community
programming, or carry advertising.
Even though the Canadian Admiral decision found that the CATV
transmission was a performance, albeit not in public, Canadian courts might
reach the conclusion that the U.S. Supreme Court has reached. 61 Whichever
approach is adopted, there would appear to be no copyright liability for
CATV transmission.
Although the plaintiffs argue that the use of broadcast signals constitutes
unfair competition contrary to section 7 (e) of the Trade Marks Act,102 this
proposition will be of little benefit. The section was held ultra vires by the
Supreme Court of Canada in a recent decision.163
The chances of a successful termination of the cable deletion policy
through the courts are dim. Both time constraints and judicial role perception
fail to make the courts an attractive forum for American broadcasters. It is
157 (1954-55), 20 Can. P.R. 75 (Exch.) at 97, 101. Under s. 3 (1) of the Copyright
Act, the copyright holder has the sole right "to perform ... the work or any substantial
part thereof in public." Cameron J. found that the transmissions were a performance
(id. at 404), but not "in public" (id. at 408).
158 (1968), 392 U.S. 390.
159 (1974), 415 U.S. 394.
160 Capital Cities, supra, note 95 at 16.
161 Realizing that a judicial solution to the problem of cable television and copyright was not feasible, the United States Congress recently enacted a new Copyright Law
which legislatively solves the problem (17 U.S.C. § 111, enacted October 19, 1976,
effective January 1, 1978).
162 R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10. The Act applies to nationals of those states which have
signed the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1883. Both
Canada and the U.S. ratified the 1934 revision of the treaty (U.S.T.S. 941).
163 Vapor Canada Ltd. v. MacDonald (1976), 7 N.R. 477.
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on the diplomatic or political level that more effective action must be sought.
One cannot say, however, that the Supreme Court has failed to play a role
in the decision process with regard to communications law, even though its
ultimate decision was delayed and other developments have made its pronouncements almost moot in the international context. By leaving the commercial deletion policy in operation, the court has strengthened the authority
of the Canadian government in this area. The decision, as made, has peripheral impact on the question of U.S.-Canadian communications policy in
general, since it only leaves the other participants in their present bargaining
positions.
3.

Diplomatic Decisions

The State Department took official action very soon after the CRTC
implemented its commercial deletion policy, 164 with its Aide-M6moire of
February 13, 1973. Consistent with the U.S. policy of free flow of information, the Department asked the Canadian government to intervene to rescind
or modify the Calgary decision. The Department also instructed U.S. consular
posts in border areas in Canada to monitor U.S. television broadcasts received
in Canada and report on their treatment. Prior to the public protest, informal
discussions had occurred.
The Canadian Department of External Affairs was not quick to reply to
the Aide-Mmoire, but when it did so in October, 1973, it rejected the State
Department's request for intervention. A note from the State Department followed on December 4, 1973, requesting delay while the policy was reviewed.
External Affairs replied on January 16, 1974, saying that the "complex"
commercial deletion policy was under review in interested government departments and that External Affairs would contact the State Department on completion of the review. It pointed out that the CRTC is an independent regulatory
agency with a statutory mandate with respect to broadcasting policy. As the
Calgary decision was made in the exercise of this mandate, the Canadian
government could not agree to modify or rescind the decision.
The State Department was understandably upset by the note.1 65 While the
CRTC is independent in implementing a broadcasting policy for Canada,
there is still room for discussion of the policy to be pursued. From the response of External Affairs, it would seem that as of early 1974, the Canadian
Cabinet and the departments concerned were quite content to rest with the
CRTC's action, and so External Affairs formulated its response to leave the
action intact.
There seems to have been something of a hiatus on the diplomatic front
104 At least at the initial stages, it was the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
which handled the issue, rather than the expected Canadian Desk (Bureau of European
Affairs), showing the important economic basis of the dispute (U.S. H. of Rep., supra,
note 59 at 53.) These two bureaus have worked together subsequently.
165 B. Pettey and E. Allebas, in Resurgence of Canadian Nationalism and its Effect
on American-CanadianCommunications Relations (1974), 9 J. of Int. L & Econ. 149,
quote a State Department official as saying "[n]uts! How would it be if our State
Department said it couldn't talk to FCC about a problem?"
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in the cable television dispute during 1974. The inactivity of the State Department is born out by the Buffalo television stations' reluctant resort to litigation
to protect their interests. Discontent with the State Department's inactivity
was also expressed in the House of Representatives Subcommittee on InterAmerican Affairs, which held hearings on United States-Canadian Broadcasting Relations on April 25, 1974.166 The House Subcommittee took no
action after hearing witnesses from various border television stations, the
Federal Communications Commission, the State Department, and Rogers
Cable Television of Toronto.
Further pressure on the State Depratment came from other political
sources. Senator Buckley and other legislators from New York and Senators
Magnuson and Jackson from Washington called for Secretary of State Kissinger to take action in letters in June and September of 1975. Later in that
year, diplomatic efforts were revived. In October Kissinger met with his Canadian counterpart, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable
Allen MacEachen, to discuss commercial deletion. The pending appeal in the
Supreme Court of Canada was cited as a reason for delaying further decisions.
Then, on January 13, 1976, despite the absence of a Supreme Court
decision, a diplomatic meeting was held in Ottawa, attended by Canadian
officials from the CRTC, External Affairs, and the Department of Communications, and American officials from the FCC and the State Department. The
commercial deletion policy was discussed, and the Canadian officials agreed
to receive any U.S. representations on alternative means for attaining the
goals of the deletion policy. 167
The result was a further meeting in March between the CRTC and a
delegation from the border stations. The proposal put forth can only be understood in conjunction with a contemporaneous Canadian decision, the enactment of Bill C-58.
4.

Bill C-58
Bill C-58, 168 introduced in April, 1975, is a short piece of legislation
with the innocuous title, "An Act to amend the Income Tax Act." It became
more infamously known as "The Time-Reader's Digest Bill." Its provisions
were twofold: the elimination of the income tax deduction for advertisements
placed in non-Canadian periodicals, thus ending a special status held by
Time and Reader's Digest since 1966 and a similar treatment of advertising
16

OSupra, note 59, at 7, 28. Mitchell Wolfson, president of Wometco Enterprises,

stated that, "[wle have asked to appear before you because other remedies, including
representations through our own Department of State have thus far proved unsuccessful."
167
This information and that following is detailed in a letter from Harry Boyle,
CRTC Chairman, to Senator Keith Davey, dated June 9, 1976, and printed in Issue 91
of the Can. Sen. Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, supra, note
60 at 91:53-54.
168 Now S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 106, amending the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72,
c. 63. Royal assent was granted July 16, 1976, and the Act was proclaimed on September 21, 1976, to come into force September 22, 1976.
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expenses incurred for "an advertisement directed primarily to a market in
Canada and broadcast by a foreign broadcasting undertaking." 169
The rationale for the legislation is clear. The American border stations
carried on Canadian CATV undertakings had been siphoning advertising
revenue from Canadian stations, at an estimated rate of up to $20 million
per year.170 By deleting the income tax deduction for such advertisers, the
price of an advertisement was effectively doubled. Coupled with the commercial deletion policy, Bill C-58 makes advertising on U.S. stations aimed at
the Canadian market an unattractive investment and, theoretically, should
direct money back to Canadian broadcasters. 171
The State Department objected to Bill C-58, both during its enactment
and subsequently. In the January 13, 1976, meeting of officials, the Canadians
refused to listen to protests on this, saying that the issue was one for Parliament. The debate over Bill C-58 became enmeshed with the commercial
deletion policy, despite the Canadian government's argument that they should
be viewed separately. In fact, it is difficult to see how they can be separated,
for their purpose is the same-to make advertising on foreign television
unattractive and to promote Canadian access to television programming.
Functionally, they are somewhat different, since commercial deletion is a
direct physical interference with the signals of the foreign station, while Bill
C-58 is designed to promote advertising in Canada through taxation measures
addressed to Canadian taxpayers that make Canadian advertising financially
more attractive. It does not coerce such advertising nor does it act extraterritorially.
In the March meeting between the CRTC and the border stations, the
broadcasters proposed that they could establish some type of tax presence in
Canada, similar to that already established in Vancouver by KVOS to sell
advertising. Income from Canadian advertisers would then be subject to
Canadian taxes. 172 This proposal was rejected by the CRTC, however, because it was conditioned on the promise that Bill C-58 would not be implemented. 173 One might speculate that another reason for rejecting the proposal
was its content. It assumes that the Canadian government is only interested in
holding revenue in Canada which it can then tax. At most, the establishment
of shell corporations in Canada would allow for the creation of a government
169 Now s. 19.1 of the Income Tax Act.
170 This is the figure used by the Hon. Jeanne Sauv6, Minister of Communications,
before the Can. Sen. Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, supra,
note 60, Issue 84, May 6, 1976, at 84:37. The U.S. stations refute this figure, claiming
that some of their revenue from Canadian advertisers remains in Canada through commissions to Canadian advertising agencies or, in the case of KVOS in Bellingham, through
income taxes paid by its Canadian subsidiary, U.S. H. of Rep., supra, note 59 at 13;
see contra, id. at 31.
171
Znaimer, supra, note 76, claims that border stations reduced their advertising
rates after the enactment of Bill C-58, so as to retain Canadian directed ads. Thus, he
argues, commercial deletion must be retained in order to protect Canadian broadcasters
from this "dumping" by U.S. stations.
172 Can. Sen. Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, supra, note
60, Issue 93, June 16, 1976, at 93:7-8.
173 Id., Issue 91, at 91:53-54.
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fund from the new tax revenue generated. While the government could designate that the fund be used for the establishment of a Canadian programme
industry, this would involve creating an extensive administrative framework
to operate the fund and define standards for grants. The Canadian government wants Canadian programmes, but it seems to have committed itself to
a commercial structure for programming, in which advertisements fund programming development and the market sets the standards for content. One
might wonder if the resulting product will truly reflect "Canadianism" as
desired by a policy based on acculturation and nationalism, for there is a real
danger that the product will duplicate the bland, lowest common-denominator
approach for which American programming is at present maligned.17 4 Yet
that is the Canadian government's policy choice and no doubt a major reason
for its rejection of this proposal.
With the CRTC unwilling to discuss both commercial deletion and Bill
C-58, the State Department resorted to Parliament, where Bill C-58 was still
in the process of enactment. The recently appointed American ambassador
to Canada, Thomas Enders, took the initiative and informed the Senate Banking Committee studying the bill of the U.S. government's position with regard
to the legislation. The U.S. felt that implementation should be delayed while
the two governments sought an alternative "more positive" arrangement to
meet Canadian objectives. 7 5 The Ambassador met with a sympathetic audience in this Committee. Instead of the pro forma ratification of a bill that
usually occurs in the Canadian Senate, there were extensive hearings followed
by a report on June 22, 1976, proposing amendments to the bill. 17 This
development, while unusual, is not surprising when one considers the business
backgrounds of the Senators on the committee. They expressed fears about
the uncertain climate that American businessmen have been finding in Canada
recently with foreign investment controls, potash nationalization, and broadcasting controls. The reaction to the Senate Committee's action in political
circles was heated, for the government was under pressure to adjourn for the
summer and end the longest session in the history of the Canadian Parliament.
Not surprisingly, the Senate referred the report back to its Committee and a
revised report on July 14 removed all obstacles to passage. 77 By the fall of
1976, two policies, commercial deletion and the income tax provision, were
in operation to try to direct television advertising dollars to Canadian stations.
G. A DECISION: FINAL OR INTERIM?
Diplomatic discussions continued with regard to commercial deletion
after the March meeting and the enactment of Bill C-58, with meetings of
7 4

See Peers, supra, note 52 at 154, who believes that this danger will become a
reality in a commercially structured system.
175 Can. Sen. Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, supra, note
60, Issue 91, at 91:7-8.
176 Id., Issue 94, June 22, 1976.
17 7 Id., Issue 95. The Senators won something of a victory, for the Minister of Communications agreed to postpone proclamation of the broadcasting sections of the Act
until she was sure that there was adequate time available on Canadian television stations
for Canadian advertisers (id. at 95:7). The Act was not proclaimed until September of
1976 (supra, note 168).
'
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officials in June and October, 1976, and talks between Secretary of State
Kissinger and his new Canadian counterpart, the Honourable Don Jamieson,
on October 15, 1976. Out of these meetings came proposals for a solution
to the "television war" which resulted in the termination of the commercial
deletion policy, by Cabinet decision, in January of 1977.178 Bill C-58 was left
commercial deletion stopped except in Toronto, Calgary, and
intact, but 179
Edmonton.

What seems to have emerged during these diplomatic discussions is a
more active role by the Canadian Cabinet in the formation of cable television
policy and, more specifically, commercial deletion. In the past, the CRTC
and the Cabinet took similar positions on communications policy. That this
has changed is illustrated by several events. For example, at the October 6
meeting of officials, Harry Boyle, Chairman of the CRTC, was ordered to
stay in Ottawa. 180 This seemed to signal a government effort to exercise a
more dominant role in commercial deletion policy and this was confirmed
when Jamieson said that the government, that is, the Cabinet, was considering
whether to take a position on the most recent U.S. proposals, whether or not
in concert with the CRTC.' 8 ' Jamieson himself is much more "pro-American"
than some of his predecessors involved in the cable television policy, and the
present Cabinet seems to be decidedly less nationalistic than that of a few
years ago.' 8 2
Nowhere was the reduced policy role for the CRTC and the expanded
role for the Cabinet more clearly evidenced than in Bill C-43, "An Act
respecting telecommunications in Canada."' 83 Subsection 9 (1) would au178

The solution seems to have been worked out in a discussion between CanadianAmerican officials in a meeting on October 6 (Maclean's, October 18, 1976, at 17).
Their proposals were discussed by Kissinger and MacEachen (Can. H. of C., Debates,
30th Parl. 2nd sess., January 24, 1977, at 2273). The termination of the commercial
deletion policy seems to be temporary, to last until 1979, according to the Globe and
Mail (July 9, 1977, at 8). See also CRTC, Public Announcement on "Commercial Deletion" (January 21, 1977).
170 Globe and Mail, July 9, 1977, at 8. The CRTC's announcement on the termination of commercial deletion is a fine example of double speak, never clearly stating that
the policy has been ended. At 2, one finds:
The Commission has now been informed by the Minister of Communications, the
Honourable Jeanne Sauv6, that the Government fully supports the objectives which
have led the CRTC to institute the commercial deletion policy, but considers that
the feasibility of other methods of achieving the same objectives should be
examined by the Commission before commercial deletion is further implemented.
In addition, the Government considers that time should be allowed for an assessment of the effects of Section 19.1 of the Income Tax Act and of simultaneous
program substitution. The Commission will undertake the requested examination
and assessment.
180 Miller, supra, note 58, col. 2 (although a Communiqu6 states that CRTC officials were present).
181 Can. H. of C., Debates, supra, note 178, October 18, 1976, at 146.
82
1 See L Urqhart, "The Welcome Wagon" in Maclean's, November 1, 1976, at 40n.
Jamieson is quoted as saying, "[all my life I have had a love affair with the United
States" (id. at 40). In contrast, though, may be the Hon. John Roberts, Secretaory of State,
who is responsible for the CBC.
183 First reading March 22, 1977. Reintroduced January 26, 1978 as Bill C-24.
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thorize the Cabinet to issue directions to the CRTC respecting the implementation of telecommunications policy, 184 thus putting the major voice for
telecommunication policy in the political sphere. 55 The result is likely to be
more trade-offs in communications policy development in order to respond
to varying constituencies and pressures, whether from the U.S. State Department or electorates seeking wider coverage of American programmes.180 The
termination of commercial deletion seems to presage such a development.
One's first response is to ask what triggered the end of the commercial
deletion policy. There had been threats of retaliatory action by various claimants in the U.S., although it is unlikely that the Canadian government took
them seriously. These included a threat to jam signals crossing the border,
and an application for approval of jamming was made to the FCC by the
Buffalo stations in October, 1975. Whether or not jamming is illegal under
international law, 87 the FCC is unlikely to approve the application. As
184 That section now reads in part:

9. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the Governor in Council may, by order, issue
directions to the Commission from time to time respecting the implementation of
the telecommunication policy for Canada enunciated in section 3 [similar to the
present section 3 of the BroadcastingAct.].
(2) Nothing in this Act authorizes the Governor in Council to issue directions
to the Commission with respect to
(a) the issue of a broadcasting licence to a particular applicant or the amendment or renewal of a particular broadcasting licence,
(b) the content of broadcast programming;
(c) the application of qualitative standards to broadcast programming,
(d) the restriction of freedom of expression, or
(e) the charges to be levied for particular telecommunication services or
facilities. ....

Other sections also seem to diminish CRTC independence - e.g. s. 11 (power of the
Governor in Council to refer back decisions) and s. 7 (power of the Minister of Communications to register agreements with provinces regarding the exercise of the powers
of the CRTC or the Minister by a provincial regulatory body).
The Minister of Communications had already gone ahead and signed an agreement
with the province of Manitoba regarding ownership of cable-television distribution equipment on November 10, 1976. The terms of the agreement, allowing the Manitoba Telephone
System to own the equipment and lease it to cable television companies, directly opposed
CRTC policy. Boyle, Chairman of the CRTC, immediately sought a legal opinion on its
validity (Globe and Mail, Nov. 23, 1976, at BI, col. 4).
185 This is a clear policy of the Minister of Communications (Globe and Mail, July
9, 1977, at 10). It cannot be faulted in terms of political theory about democracy. See,
for example, L. Cutler and D. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process (1975),
84 Yale LJ. 1395 at 1405-06.
8
' 6 The CRTC is much more committed to creation of a Canadian culture than the
average Canadian. Nationalism often seems to be a pre-occupation of the middle class
and the university communities and of far less interest in an election than inflation,
unemployment, or bilingualism.
187 The U.N. General Assembly condemned jamming in Resolution 424 (V) and
425 (V), December 14, 1950. However, an opinion dated February 28, 1973, by J. Willis,
Deputy Assistant Legal Advisor for U.N. Affairs in the State Department, concluded that
no conventional law either prohibited or sanctioned jamming, [1973] Digest of United
States Practice in International Law, 327. See contra, Abshire, supra, note 10 at 50 jamming is contrary to the Montreux International Telecommunications Convention
and Art. 19 of the U.N. Universal Declarationof Human Rights.
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Richard Wiley, Chairman of the FCC, testified before the House of Representatives Subcommittee,
The United States has always supported a policy of free flow of information and
ideas between ourselves and other countries, and any retaliatory measures which
would result in restricting such free flow would be highly questionable and counterproductive and, of course, could only be considered in close coordination188with
the Department of State, and in light of our overall relations with Canada.

The precedent set by U.S. authorization of jamming would be a weighty one
in the larger world telecommunications picture, and it would run counter to
the traditional U.S. policy of free flow of information. It would also be an
unusually drastic measure to use against Canada, as the ability to engage in
dialogue between the two countries has always been extolled.
Other retaliatory activities against Canada have been suggested, such as
invocation of the sanctioning provisions of the Trade Act of 19 74.1s 9 However, in light of the friction which would be caused by such a measure and
the need for an ongoing dialogue between Canada and the U.S., it is unlikely
that this Act would be applied.
Rather than these immediate threats of retaliatory action, it is the longterm threat to the diplomatic relationship with the U.S. that probably caused
the Cabinet to end commercial deletion. U.S. government and businesses have
been upset by many Canadian actions in the last few years, 2 0 and, by January, 1977, the commercial deletion policy could seemingly be sacrificed with
positive results for Canadian-American relations and without serious injury
to Canadian interests. Yet it is safe to say that no Canadian government will
abandon a broadcasting policy dedicated to promoting Canadian identity.'"'
Since Canadian programming is necessary to that policy, there must be some
means of protecting the revenue sources of those broadcasters expected to
produce Canadian programmes. While commercial deletion was once the
chosen tool, Bill C-58 now seems to go far towards achieving that goal. Even
though it outrages American border stations who bear the brunt of the burden
188 Supra, note 59 at 39.

189 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a). Discussed in the Congressmen's Report, supra, note 80 at
18. Under § 2411(a), the President can impose duties or other import restrictions on the
goods of a foreign country if he finds that it maintains unjust restrictions on U.S. goods
or discriminates against U.S. goods. Under § 2191 (c) (C), the Special Representative
for Trade Negotiations can investigate and advise the President and Congress about nontariff barriers to international trade.
190 See "Interview with Thomas Enders, U.S. Ambassador to Canada," U.S. News
and World Report, June 21, 1976, at 67.

191 In fact, the Hon. John Roberts, Secretary of State, has evinced the often repeated
concern that Canadian broadcasters are not creating enough Canadian programming and
has spoken of the possibility of yet another government inquiry, this time a royal commission, on broadcasting (Globe and Mail, June 15, 1977, at 10). No decision has been
taken at the time of writing (Can. H. of C. Debates, Nov. 30, 1977, at 1408 per Roberts).
See also, B. Kirby, "Opposing Forces gather to do battle on Canada's broadcasting
front," (Globe and Mail, July 9, 1977, at 10) discussing the report of the Ontario Commission on TV violence (the LaMarsh Commission) and the report of A. Johnson,
President of CBC, and its proposals for reform. Both reports express concern about
domination from American programming. (Globe and Mail, June 15, 1977, at 1).

OSGOODE HALL LAV JOURNAL

[VCOL. 15, No. 3

imposed by the Act, the measure is easily defensible. Unlike the commercial
deletion policy, it in no way interferes with the signals broadcast by foreign
stations.
Furthermore the CRTC has placed increasing emphasis on its programme substitution policy, which complements Bill C-58. If a local station
shows a programme that is telecast by a U.S. station at any time within the
same week, it is proposed that the CATV operator substitute the programme
signals of the Canadian station in the time slot of the U.S.-originated programme. 192 Already, a great deal of simulcasting has developed in Canada,
with Canadian broadcasters scheduling shows that also appear on U.S. stations in the same time slot. The CATV operator must black out the American
signal, and substitute the Canadian signal with its ads.' 93 Programme substitution and simulcasting eliminate the unjust enrichment problem caused by
using U.S. programme signals without advertisements. These policies also
make the local station a more attractive advertising market because of its
extended coverage.
Yet the question remains whether the programme substitution policy and
the Income Tax Act amendments will suffice to combat the drain of advertising revenue to American stations carried on cable television. There are
those who deny the efficacy of these policies without the accompaniment of
the commercial deletion policy. 94 "Dumping" by U.S. stations, in the form
of drastically reduced advertising rates, is feared and commercial deletion
may be necessary to prevent Canadian-directed advertisements from clustering around shows that are not simulcast.' 95
H. CONCLUSION
While Canadian cable television policy has appeared offensive to Americans in many ways, it has been so largely because of the apparent unjust enrichment that characterizes CATV operations anywhere. The fact that broadcast signals transmitted by the CATV operations have crossed an international
border has aggravated the perennial problem of CATV interference with local
broadcast licences, by importing international law considerations. Yet the
Canadian decision to adopt a policy of active government control over the
degree of foreign content of the broadcasting industry is not without precedent. In Europe, measures have been taken on both international and domestic levels to combat pirate broadcasting when it has threatened to undermine
Toronto Star, October 20, 1976, at 1.
Globe and Mail, supra, note 103. See SOR/75-665, s. 19 (substitution of identical signals on cable television).
19 4 See Znaimer, supra, note 76.
195
The CRTC continues to show concern for advertising on American television
stations by Canadian advertisers by imposing a condition in the licences of some cable
television companies in the following form:
The Commission approves the reception and distribution of the U.S. television
stations so long as these stations do not solicit in Canada advertising primarily
directed to a Canadian audience.
(CRTC Dec. 77-596, Canada Gazette, Pt. I, Oct. 1, 1977; see also CRTC Dec. 77-603,
Canada Gazette, Pt. 1, Oct. 8, 1977).
192
'93
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the integrity of the local broadcasting system. 106 Even the United States has
from stataken action to protect local broadcasting licensees from19intrusions
7
provisions.
statutory
through
territory,
U.S.
outside
tions
However, the U.S. through its broadcast policy was careful to restrict
its licensing measures to broadcasters within the U.S., in order to prevent
transmission across the border to a foreign country. The Canadian commercial deletion policy, while applied to cable television operators within Canada,
was directed to broadcasts emanating from outside the country. Thus, the
international law issue of free flow of communications arose. The CanadianAmerican broadcasting relationship is in many ways unique because of the
massive use of cable television in Canada and the proximity of Canadians to
a broadcast industry using the same language. Yet, while the problems posed
are in many ways unique, the broader international law issues involved in
their solution are not. Canada's commercial deletion policy, if allowed to
stand, sets a precedent for a state to accept some foreign broadcasts and not
others and to delete offensive parts of those broadcasts accepted. Such actions
run counter to the U.S. policy of free flow of information, and for the U.S.
to acquiesce in such action would amount to accepting a change in international law. As earlier discussion pointed out, international law is created
by a flow of decisions from various participants. Should the U.S. agree to the
alteration of foreign broadcast signals by Canada, it would alter expectations
of other states as to what is permissible in telecommunications law in other
situations. This the U.S. government did not wish to do.
Of course, not all the U.S. participants in the decision-making process
approached the controversy from the viewpoint of averting a harmful precedent in international law. The broadcasters did so out of economic self-interest,
and even the U.S. government's policy proposals were not uncoloured by
economic motives. Similarly, while the Canadian government's policy was
framed in terms of concern for "access" by Canadians to. television, there
were motives of economic self-interest and political self-interest underlying
the domestic policy, as well as the international stance in favour of freedom
of information, but with prior consent.
At this point, the U.S. has preserved relatively intact the policy of free
flow of information. Yet one might easily speculate as to whether the calm in
Canadian-American communications relations will survive. Discontent per-

196 The efforts to combat pirate broadcasting, that is, broadcasting without authorization from outside the territorial limits of a state into the territory of the state, have
included a European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations Outside National Territories (1965) and legislation such as the British Marine, etc.
Broadcasting (Offences) Act (1967, c. 41). See D. Smith, Pirate Broadcasting (1968),
41 So. Cal. L. Rev. 769. The British efforts are similar to Bill C-58 for, inter alia, they
prohibit advertisements on the pirate stations, thus eliminating the stations' source of
revenue (s. 5 (3) (e) ).
197 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §325 (b) requires a licence for transmission of
signals across the border for purposes of re-broadcast to the U.S. The problems of signals from Mexico to San Diego are discussed in T. Tibbals, Mexican-United States
Border Broadcasting Dilemma (1973-74), 4 Calif. W. Int. L.J 141.
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sists with Bill C-58's provisions, 198 although the U.S. has little legal right to
object to domestic tax legislation that is non-discriminatory. 100 It is unlikely
to be that legislative measure which sparks new controversy, however. Rather,
a revived commercial deletion policy or further restrictions on American television channels carried on cable is the more likely move, as both the CRTC
discontent with the
and the Secretary of State express renewed and continued
200
paucity and poor quality of Canadian programming.
The Canadian government's concern has been one of access to the television media. As international law with regard to telecommunications continues to develop, it is likely that the policy which will persist is one in which
the free flow of information is restricted in the national interest in order to
allow national access to the media, and Canadian policy regarding U.S. signals
can be shaped to accord with this. It is unlikely that the U.S. can successfully
oppose all international claims for a degree of state control over broadcasting
from foreign sources. While freedom of information is a worthwhile objective,
it is unrealistic to expect that it can exist in an unrestricted manner in the
world community, for all states wish to protect their cultural identity and
promote national unity. Therefore, some state control over broadcasting is
and will be a reality in international law.
This recognition is not incompatible with the ideal telecommunications
policy mentioned earlier. While world public order is most enhanced when
individuals are given the freedom to express opinions and make choices, this
does not necessarily mean that some degree of control over individual speech
is inconsistent with human dignity. One must look at the reason for controls
over speech. Where they are designed to ensure that an individual has access
to an outlet by which to express himself, or to shield him from information
that is highly offensive to him as an individual, regulation of the free flow of
information on broadcast media is consistent with human dignity and world
public order. It is difficult to draw a line between controls that are consistent
"with human dignity and those that detract from it. Where controls forbid discussion of any controversial issues and prohibit opposing viewpoints, they
cannot be compatible with individual dignity. In the international context
there must be some balance between national control and the flow of ideas
from outside the border.
Recognizing the likelihood of such policies evolving internationally, the
U.S. and Canada can work together to shape their communications relations
in a way that fosters what they regard as the most healthy balance between
free flow of information and national control.
Domestically, Canada has made some effort to effect such a balanced
policy by developing Canadian content rules designed to protect access and
198 Questions persist in the House of Commons as to whether Bill C-58 will be
eliminated. See, for example, Can. H. of C., Debates, 30th Par]. 2d sess., Jan. 27, 1977,
at 2440.
199 Its political clout, as opposed to legal right, is another matter, as the persistent
analogy of the elephant and mouse makes clear.
2
0 CRTC, supra, note 115.
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leaving remaining broadcast time open to foreign programming. There is
room for bilateral discussions to ensure that such content controls or further
advertising measures do not interfere substantially with the international flow
of information and to ensure that the U.S. is not to be placed in a position
of having to sanction unilateral interferences with broadcasts by Canada.
The alternatives for dealing with cross-border broadcasting are several,
and the need for some exploration of their viability is clear.20 1 Boyle, while
Chairman of the CRTC, suggested that a ban on all Canadian advertisements
on U.S. stations and all U.S. advertisements on Canadian stations might be
the ideal solution.20 2 The feasibility of this suggestion is slight, considering the
predominantly one-way direction of advertisements from Canada to the U.S.
There might also be constitutional problems in the U.S. with such a plan.203
Another possible solution would be for cable television operators in
Canada to pay some compensation to U.S. stations whose advertising is deleted. This could be modelled on the compulsory licensing provisions for
cable systems introduced by the revision of U.S. Copyright Laws,204 requiring
cable operators to pay royalty fees for non-network programmes carried beyond the local service area. This would not compensate border stations if
cable systems transmitted network shows, for Buffalo stations are not licensed
by copyright holders to show them in Canada nor are they harmed by the
extended use. It would only be local programmes that would be compensated.
No doubt Canadian cable operators would protest, for it is not this type of
programme which they seek from Buffalo stations. Canadian broadcasters
would also object, unless offered similar remuneration by the cable operators.
That some arrangement is necessary to protect Canadian broadcasters'
access to revenue and thus enable them to develop programming is obvious.
At the same time, there is a need to consider compensating American border
stations when signals are transmitted that are not obtainable in Canada. The
solution may be the establishment of some type of intergovernmental mechanism to make recommendations on broadcasting regulation, in the same way
that the International Joint Commission regulates boundary waters between
the two states. Telecommunications media have important impacts on both
sides of the border, and there has been much cooperation in satellite develop201 There is a danger of further and severe restrictions on foreign programming in
Canada. Johnson's report on the CBC states a goal of 80 percent Canadian content
(Globe and Mail, June 15, 1977, at 1), while Secretary of State John Roberts has announced new working restrictions on foreign performers through provisions in the Immigration Act (Globe and Mail, July 8, 1977, at 1).
202 Can. Sen. Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, supra, note
60, Issue 93 (June 16, 1976) at 93:12: "[w]e do not take local advertising on our
border stations, and they do not take any advertising on their stations ... I have been
told in Washington by senior people ... that that is the resolution of it."
203 The hitherto largely unprotected status of commercial speech is in a rapid state
of erosion, with cases such as Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (1976), 425 U.S. 748; Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro (1977), 97 S. Ct. 1614 and Rates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977), 45 U.S.L.W.
4895 recognizing that commercial speech is protected to some degree by the First
Amendment.
204 17 U.S.C. § 101 ff., particularly § 111 (c) (effective January 1, 1978).
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ment and frequency allocation in the past. The degree of interaction and the
complexity of issues is not yet as great as the manifold concerns of the IJC
in regulating boundary waters, and a joint body at present might be only for
purposes of consultation. As satellite broadcasting develops and links up
with cable TV and television, an international regulatory body for telecommunications will be needed by Canada and the U.S.
Initially, a commission of officials from the CRTC and FCC could try
to draft nonbinding guidelines for cable television, drawing on their parallel
domestic experience with cable television's threat to local licences. Inevitably,
discussion must also focus on foreign programming and protection of both
foreign and national access to broadcast outlets. Any solutions can only benefit the Canadian-American relationship, and will also provide both an example
for and possible solutions to telecommunications problems elsewhere in the
world. 205
The U.N.'s Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites has concluded
that regional and bilateral solutions to telecommunications problems are the
way of the immediate future. 20 6 Canada and the U.S. could confirm the viability of such an approach by working out a solution to transnational broadcasting that protects the integrity of the broadcasting system of the recipient
state while ensuring that borders are kept open to a certain degree of foreign
information.
205

As the UC has done in relation to international boundary waters issues.

206 U.N. Working Group, supra, note 41, Fifth Session (A/AC 105/WG 3/L 8 at

3); U.N. General Assembly, Resolution 2733 A (XXV); Laskin and Chayes, supra,
note 16 at 33.

